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Trends in the 1980 Congressional Elections:

by Susan M. Arico



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Besides the regular publications, both divisions of the foundation sponsor conferences, conduct survey research, and publish monographs and shorter studies.

Trends in the 1980 Congressional Elections:

A Conference Report
by Susan M. Arico

The Free Congress Research
& Education Foundation

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Susan Marshner Arico, was graduated from Goucher College, Towson, Maryland in 1974. She worked for the House of Representatives and was a researcher for the Heritage Foundation, concentrating on legislation affecting children and families. Mrs. Arico is author of a Heritage monograph entitled, "Man: A Course of Study; Prototype for Federalized Textbooks," and a Free Congress Foundation study, "Unity and Diversity: A Comparative Look at the Close Elections in 1978." From June 1978 to December 1980 she served as Editor of *The Political Report,* a weekly newsletter covering House and Senate elections, published by the Free Congress Foundation. A resident of Springfield, Virginia, Mrs. Arico lives with her husband Dan and their son Joseph.

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Trends in the 1980 Congressional Elections: A Conference Report by Susan Aric

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721 Second Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
202-546-3004

Library of Congress Catalog Card No.: 81-69208

First Printing
Price: $2.50

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CHAPTER I

The Campaigns and the Districts

A political science class meeting for the first time to discuss the 1980 election results, why they occurred, and the trends they set into motion would have an enormous task to perform. At the outset, the presidential race might appear to be the logical starting point. The class could consider how the widespread frustration with non-stop inflation or the concern that the United States was becoming a second-rate international power affected the race. Yet, an analysis which restricted itself to such large-scale issues would be superficial if it did not also look at the crucial factors affecting the House and Senate contests.

In many ways, the congressional races are more indicative than presidential campaigns of what motivates the electorate in a given election year and how deep-seated its desires really are. A change at the presidential level may or may not accompany a major turnover in Congress. But when it does, as in the 1980 elections, it is clear that something which goes beyond the superficial media excitement always surrounding a presidential race may be developing. While information about the House and Senate races is somewhat more difficult to obtain, the common themes and techniques employed in these contests indicate future directions campaigns will take in the next few years.

Some of the themes heard in the 1980 races are already well-known. Whether the district was urban or rural, Democrats generally attacked their Republican opponents on the same set of basic issues. They charged their opposition with accepting money from such special interests as oil companies and political action committees. They criticized their ties to big business and their "unworkable" economic proposals. Democrats tried to avoid being labelled "liberal" or "progressive," while they stressed the need to cut spending and improve the United States' defense posture. Republicans heavily emphasized inflation, deficit spending, and taxes. They talked about the growth of government and over-regulation. Many candidates used the idea the Republican party was promoting nationally, "Vote Republican for a Change." They specifically attacked their opponents on particular spending and defense votes. These campaign themes appeared again and again, and it seems clear from the results that Republicans came closer to touching a sensitive nerve.

It was also an election year that was marked by increasing activity on the part of political action committees and independent expenditure groups. Although a number of liberal organizations, such as the League of Conservation Voters and the National Abortion Rights Action League, participated in selective races, conservative groups seemed to dominate the scene. The activities of the National Conservative Political Action Committee, Moral Majority, the National Rifle Association, Eagle Forum, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, and numerous right to life groups were very well publicized, and several leading liberals have now formed their own rival organizations.

Altogether, the winning Republican candidates seemed to dominate and control the debate, something which Democrats had done very well in the past. If the issues were with the GOP in 1980, there were other trends which were somewhat more subtle. In many areas of the country, the old Democratic coalition of organized labor, blue collar workers, ethnics and Catholics failed to hold together, not only in the statewide races, but also at the congressional level. At the same time, many Republican campaigns were geared toward identifying and attracting ticket-splitters.

As important as all the larger trends were in the 1980 elections and as useful as it is to understand them, it is also very important to examine the specific campaign techniques which made the results possible. The trends may have helped elect conservatives, but without the mechanical ability to execute specific campaign activities, few changes would have been made in Congress. A trend hardly ever offers anyone a ride to the polls.

In an effort to examine the successful and unsuccessful techniques used by campaigns during the 1980 election cycle, the Free Congress Foundation invited seven campaigns from very diverse districts to participate in an intensive, four-day conference from December 11-14 in Fontana, Wisconsin. All of the campaigns were closely contested. Some took place in open districts, while others were directed against incumbents. Some of the candidates were Republican, and others were Democrats. When each is examined individually, the differences between them seem as great as the differences between any two people. Some had severe cash flow problems. Others were hampered by poor management, and in some cases the candidates themselves were less than ideal. Some had no voter identification programs, and others had highly sophisticated computer-assisted phone bank operations. Both the campaigns represented and their opposition were studied in as much detail as time allowed.

The following is a list of the races examined:

Dennis McQuaid (R), opposed by Congressman John Burton (D), California 5th C.D.

David DiCarlo (D), opposed by Congressman Mark Lincoln Marks (R), Pennsylvania 24th C.D.

John Hiler (R), opposed by Congressman John Brademas (D), Indiana 3rd C.D.

Vin Weber (R), opposed by Archie Baumann (DFL) in the open 6th district of Minnesota

Howard Rutledge (R), opposed by David McCurdy (D) in the open 4th district of Oklahoma

Charles Grassley (R), opposed by U.S. Senator John Culver (D), Iowa

James Hansen (R), opposed by Congressman Gunn McKay (D), Utah 1st C.D.

Despite the individuality of each campaign, the differences did not mask the fact that certain elements emerged as essential to a viable campaign. When those elements were missing, its chances of success were greatly diminished. If they were present, it had the minimum ingredients necessary for victory.

Before conference participants settled down to the task at hand, they listened to a speech by nationally known pollster Lance Tarrance of V. Lance Tarrance Associates in Houston. He discussed the impact of independent expenditures by such groups as the National Conservative Political Action Committee, the uses of coalition building, and the importance of the last 30 days as increasing numbers of voters wait until the last minute to make their decisions. A transcript of his remarks, together with the questions directed to him afterwards, is given in chapter IV.

Once Tarrance presented his view of the larger, more general trends, participants set about the task of identifying the characteristics which distinguished winning from losing campaigns. Seven managers, representing each of the campaigns, were questioned in detail about their strategies and tactics. They were asked about specific campaign areas, including research, media, voter identification, campaign management, finance, external factors, and the candidate. They were encouraged to be direct and honest in their comments without being unfairly critical of individuals. Those who conducted the interviews were well experienced in politics as consultants and former managers themselves. After careful consideration of the seven campaigns individually, the group reconvened for discussion of the essential differences between the winners and losers.

For those who are active participants in politics, the information presented here is intended to go beyond a theoretical examination of broad political movements. Rather, it details those elements which helped make certain 1980 campaigns successful and others unsuccessful. The conference conclusions not only clarify the election results in these districts, they also indicate the direction trends in campaign techniques may take for the coming years.

So that the succeeding discussion in chapter II can take place in the proper context, what follows is a general description of each district, the candidates, key factors in the campaigns and important statistics. In the next two chapters, the conference conclusions will be presented, and the campaigns will be examined according to the major elements which played a role in their success or failure.

California's 5th District: Dennis McQuaid (R) vs. Congressman John Burton (D)

Whatever else one may say about San Francisco, it does not have a conservative image. Viewed from a distance, the city is considered a bastion of liberalism, home of two of the most liberal members of Congress, John and Phillip Burton (D). Until 1980, when Republicans launched a major effort to recover the 5th district, John was considered a safe incumbent like his brother Phillip, who represents the 6th district. Phillip's district takes in most of San Francisco and some of the city's best known tourist areas. John, who was challenged in 1980 by Republican Dennis McQuaid, represents the somewhat more marginal 5th district, which includes the northwestern section of San Francisco County and Marin County, located to the north. The San Francisco portion of the district contains some very wealthy sections, as well as some very poor neighborhoods. Marin County is a well-to-do, suburban area, and those who live there have a slightly more Republican orientation.

As might be expected, McQuaid was hoping that Marin County, which has slightly more than half of the district's voters, would provide him enough support to offset his losses in San Francisco. On the other hand, Burton needed a large turnout of liberal Democratic voters in the city to offset any losses in the county. In the actual returns, McQuaid won Marin by 9,000 votes and lost the city by 19,000. The larger than normal turnout in the Democratic areas of San Francisco clearly was a major reason for Burton's reelection. The presidential campaign of John Anderson was one important contributing factor in bringing out liberal voters. Anderson received over 10% in the district, almost double the national average. In addition, 62 candidates were running in the citywide supervisorial elections, and there was a great deal of political activity as a result.

Prior to Burton's election in 1974, the district had been held by Republican William Mailliard, who retired to take an administrative position. From 59.6% in 1974, Burton quickly increased his margin to 67% in 1978, and superficially he appeared quite secure. But a survey taken in 1979 by the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee showed that Burton had problems. The survey, one of many early "vulnerability studies" done by the Committee, showed that Burton could not be considered a "safe" incumbent. In a ballot test question, voters were asked if they would support John Burton or Republican Dennis McQuaid if the election were held today. A total of 35.1% chose Burton, 12.6% chose McQuaid, and 52.3% did not know. Burton's name recognition according to the survey stood at 53% while McQuaid, who had not previously sought public office, was an unknown.

In a second question, voters were asked to rate Burton's job performance. Altogether, 4% said "excellent," 26% "good," 19% "fair," 18% "poor," and 33% "don't know." If the opposite extremes are compared, Burton had a 4 to 1 negative rating. In another question, 34.8% approved of Burton's philosophy, 23% disapproved, and 42% did not know. The data also showed that the district is more openly liberal than many others. A total of 33.8% consider themselves liberal, 24% moderate, and 29.6% conservative. The firm Shumate-Smith conducted the survey by telephone in September, 1979.

Although the 5th district gave George McGovern 62% in 1972, it also gave Gerald Ford 1,500 more votes than it did Jimmy Carter in 1976. In 1978, Proposition 13 received 62% of the vote there.

John Burton, 49, serves on the Government Operations and House Administration Committees. He was elected to the California State Assembly in 1964, winning a seat which had formerly belonged to his brother Phil. Dennis McQuaid, 42, is an attorney from Novato who has been in private practice since 1970. Although he was chairman of the Proposition 4 effort in Marin County recently, he is a newcomer to politics. Both he and Burton were unopposed in the primary.

In the final totals, McQuaid won 89,624 votes or 45.3%. Burton received 101,105 votes or 51.1%, and a Libertarian candidate won the remaining 3.6% of the vote. McQuaid significantly outspent his opponent. His net expenditures came to more than $463,600. Burton spent about $105,100.* By contrast, the Republican who had opposed Burton in 1978 spent only $52,600.

Indiana's 3rd District: Congressman John Brademas (D) vs. John Hiler (R)

Incumbent Democrat John Brademas had been elected to the 3rd district in 1958, and after twenty years in the U.S. House of Representatives he had risen to the position of Majority Whip. Yet despite holding the number three position of power in the House, he could never consider himself a particularly "safe" incumbent. The district gave President Ford 54% in 1976, for example, and Nixon received 64% in 1972. After the 1976 election in which a very much underfinanced Republican held Brademas to 57% of the vote, the GOP took an increasing interest in the seat. Brademas could have had serious problems in 1978 when it was revealed that he had accepted campaign contributions from Tongsun Park. Unfortunately, Thomas Thorson, the same Republican who had opposed Brademas in 1976, had some problems of his own. His drunken driving violation and the fact that he had charged personal phone calls to a university credit card, prevented him from doing better than 44% in 1978.

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*Net expenditure figures are taken from Federal Election Commission reports filed through December 31, 1980.

Indiana's 3rd district is located in the far north central part of the state and is fairly compact. Its largest city, South Bend, is located in St. Joseph County, which contributes roughly 50% of the district's vote. Elkhart County generally votes Republican and accounts for about 33% of the vote, and LaPorte County, which contains the remainder, is somewhat more marginal in its voting patterns. South Bend, which is a very ethnic Catholic area, has always been a stronghold for Brademas, and St. Joseph County as a whole would usually give him a 25,000 vote lead. The district is roughly half rural and half urban, and it has a fairly large number of auto workers. It has one media market containing three television stations, and as a result it is fairly easy to use television advertising to reach the entire district. At least two underlying factors made the 1980 election in the 3rd district unlike previous years. First, the district-wide unemployment rate was 12%, and in Elkhart County, it was 15%. Second, not only was there a viable candidate interested in opposing Brademas, John Hiler, but there was a genuine Republican primary, something which the district had not witnessed in years.

John Hiler, 27, comes from a large family well-known in LaPorte County for its foundry business. In 1978, he had been asked to run for a state legislative seat, and although he had only two months in which to campaign, he lost the election by only about 400 votes. Although the race improved his name recognition in LaPorte County, neither John Hiler nor his family knew a great deal about political campaigns. Hiler was opposed in the May 6 primary by Richard Pfeil, a former president of the local Chamber of Commerce and president of a company. Although Pfeil was from South Bend and had business support, Hiler did very well in LaPorte and Elkhart counties and won with 57.9% of the vote. Pfeil received 38.2%, and a third candidate won the remainder.

In the general election campaign, it was clear from the outset that Brademas' strongest and weakest point would be his position of leadership in the House. The Brademas campaign did not apparently try to deny or de-emphasize that position. One of his themes was the amount of money and other benefits he had brought to the district because of his power in Washington. At the same time, Hiler was concentrating on economic issues, and he tied Brademas to the leadership in Washington responsible for these problems. By September the campaign took an interesting twist. Hiler was primarily using positive themes, while Brademas was directly attacking Hiler's economics and his receiving money from oil interests. Brademas' decision to attack represented a significant change in strategy from previous campaigns, in which he always ignored his opposition. There had been some early signs that Brademas was facing serious problems. A Market Opinion Research survey taken in July showed Hiler leading Brademas, 48% to 45%. At that point, Hiler already had 63% name recognition.

Including the primary and the general, Brademas' net expenditures came to $636,900, while Hiler's totalled $393,900. Altogether, Brademas received 85,136 votes or 45%. Hiler won 103,972 votes or 55%.

Iowa U.S. Senate: U.S. Senator John Culver (D) vs. Charles Grassley (R)

Long before most Iowa voters had the slightest desire to think about the next election, it was already clear that the Iowa U.S. Senate race would be one of the most important of the 1980 cycle. Like the contests in Idaho, Indiana, and South Dakota, the Iowa race involved two incumbents of starkly different political views. While Senator John Culver did not back away from the support of such groups as the League of Conservation Voters and the National Abortion Rights Action League, Chuck Grassley, on the other hand, had the assistance of such organizations as the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, the National Rifle Association, and various pro-life groups. Not only were the Culver and Grassley campaigns raising and spending large sums of money, the independent expenditure and single issue groups were also heavily involved.

Although the contest officially began in October, 1979 when Grassley announced his candidacy, he first had to face a serious primary challenge from moderate Republican Tom Stoner, who had managed Governor Robert Ray's campaigns in 1972 and 1974. Republicans in the state had hoped the primary would not become bitter, but Stoner strongly attacked Grassley's ties to the New Right and generally tried to portray him as too far to the right for Iowa Republicans. By the end of the campaign, Stoner's attacks became more strident as he accused Grassley of having links to the Trilateral Commission because he accepted a campaign donation of $150 from Chase Manhattan PAC. The attack clearly backfired on Stoner who was roundly criticized by the media. Although it appeared at one point that Stoner was gaining on Grassley, even a last minute endorsement by Governor Ray failed to save Stoner from a crushing defeat. On June 3, he received 34.5% of the vote to Grassley's 65.5% after having outspent Grassley by a 2 to 1 margin and having put $700,000 of his own money into the campaign.

With the primary over, Grassley took an immediate lead in the polls, a lead which disappeared by September. In the early summer, a Des Moines *Register* survey showed that Grassley led Culver by 53% to 36%. By early September, 47% were supporting Culver and 46% were supporting Grassley. Unlike the 1978 race between Republican Roger Jepsen and Democratic Senator Dick Clark, the Grassley-Culver race was a battle between incumbents, and each criticized the voting record of the other. The single most important issue for Grassley was the economy and the related problems of inflation and government spending. Culver talked about his accomplishments, the importance of national defense, and how he worked to control government spending by opposing the B1 bomber, for example. In addition, Culver strongly attacked Grassley for his vote against the Social Security tax increase in 1977, for his acceptance of oil money, and his ties to the New Right. He further criticized Grassley for failing to take a position on a state ERA referendum and tried to make his economic proposals appear irresponsible. Given the nature of Culver's attacks and the media's interest in ERA and the New Right, Culver's issues were dominant during early September.

After Grassley debated Culver on September 21, however, he was able to seize the initiative. Shortly thereafter in October, Grassley's media also changed and became much more hard-hitting. Of all the issues Culver raised against Grassley, survey data showed that the most damaging one was the Social Security question. A very large percentage of Iowa voters are senior citizens, and Culver was making it appear that Grassley wanted to jeopardize the system. As a response, Grassley ran his own attack ad accusing Culver of voting against a $250 tax credit for families who support elderly parents and against lifting the earnings limit for those who receive Social Security. With this and other ads, Grassley sufficiently neutralized Culver's attack to begin to regain senior citizen votes, which were a vital part of Grassley's coalition. He went on to attack Culver for missing votes, taking junkets and accepting $90,000 in honoraria. For the most part, however, the Grassley campaign persisted with its economic themes and did not significantly deviate from the original campaign plan.

Although there were many important elements in the Senate race, the involvement of the League of Conservation Voters and the National Rifle Association (NRA) proved quite significant. The League undertook a massive, door to door voter identification program across the state on Culver's behalf. The NRA did mailings to its members and to all licensed hunters in Iowa for Grassley. Both organizations made their contributions independently of the campaign, and they probably had the greatest impact of all the independent expenditures in the campaign.

John Culver, 59, served on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Public Works Committee. He was a leading proponent of arms control and the SALT treaty. Culver was elected in 1974, taking the seat vacated by retiring Senator Harold Hughes (D). He is a Harvard graduate and former aide to Senator Edward Kennedy. Charles Grassley, 58, was elected to the House of Representatives in 1974, succeeding Republican Congressman H. R. Gross. He was a member of the House Agriculture Committee and an outspoken conservative. Prior to his election to Congress, Grassley served in the Iowa House from 1959 to 1974.

In the final, official vote totals, Grassley received 683,014 votes or 53.5% of the vote. Culver won 581,545 votes or 45.5%. Grassley significantly outpolled Reagan, who received 51% of the vote. In addition, his 53.5% was the highest percentage a Republican candidate for Senate had ever received in a presidential election year in Iowa. The turnout in the state set a new record. According to FEC records, Grassley spent $1.9 million in the primary and general election. Culver spent $1.4 million and had no primary challenge.

Minnesota's 6th District: Vin Weber (I-R) vs. Archie Baumann (DFL)

Since the 1978 election, Minnesota Independent-Republicans had been watching the 6th congressional district, preparing for a major challenge to incumbent DFLer Richard Nolan. There were several reasons for Republican interest in the seat. First, Cong. Nolan was showing signs of weakness within his own party. His outspoken support for Senator Edward Kennedy in the 1980 presidential race was not appreciated by some fellow DFLers, including the pro-life segment of the party. In addition, the 6th district has had a history of fairly close elections since 1962. Republican John Zwach held the seat for eight years, but nearly lost it in 1972 to challenger Richard Nolan. Zwach retired in 1974, and Nolan won the election with 55% of the vote. The fact that Nolan was able to increase his percentage to 60% in 1976 was unusual, but it declined again to 55% in the following election year. Nolan's 1978 challenger, Russ Bjorhus, spent less than the incumbent, but still managed to defeat Nolan in Stearns County, which contains the district's largest city, St. Cloud.

During the summer of 1979, Independent-Republican Vin Weber decided to enter the race, assuming that Nolan would be his opponent.

When Nolan announced his retirement early in 1980, the decision was not altogether a surprise, although the early GOP interest in the seat suddenly took on a new focus. Two other Republicans, Mildred Thymian and Al Johnson, decided to challenge Weber for the endorsement, and four DFL candidates entered the race. After contested district conventions on May 3, Weber won the Republican endorsement and Archie Baumann won DFL support. Baumann had convention opposition from pro-life DFLers who did not like his close association with Cong. Nolan. Baumann had been a field representative for Nolan. Phyllis Christianson, DFL chairman of Mille Lacs County, for instance, circulated a letter after the convention stating that Bauman was "totally unacceptable" and predicted that pro-life DFLers would "overwhelmingly support Vin Weber for Congress over Baumann."

The 6th district includes the southwest corner of the state. It consists of 22 counties. It is mostly a rural, farming area, although it is somewhat diversified. The largest urban center is the city of St. Cloud, which has a population of about 40,000. There is also a suburban, bedroom community located in the far eastern end of the district, adjacent to the Twin Cities. It is a very fast growing, transient area, and it is not necessarily Republican-oriented. The economy of the district is almost entirely geared toward agriculture. It also has a large Catholic population and certain sections are strongly pro-life.

The 1980 campaign in the 6th district presented voters with some very sharp contrasts between two candidates whose personalities and political views were quite different. Archie Baumann, 57, had been an aide to Cong. Nolan. He was a former employee of the farmer's union and had lived in the district for many years. Baumann's theme was, "He fits the district." As a candidate, Baumann projected an image of personal warmth, emphasizing his family and his farming background. His problems within the DFL did not entirely disappear, even though Baumann took pro-life positions. On other issues, Baumann supported traditional liberal proposals, including national health insurance. He attacked Weber primarily on campaign spending and special interest contributions.

Vin Weber, on the other hand, had been away from the district for about six years when he decided to run. Weber, 28, is a former aide to Senator Rudy Boschwitz (I-R) and was involved in his 1978 campaign. Weber also publishes a newspaper in the southern part of the district and ran for State Senate but was defeated. By contrast to Baumann, Weber projected a more intellectual, less "folksy" image. At the same time, Weber took outspokenly conservative and pro-life positions and made inflation and the economy his major issues. Weber's themes, "For Us" and "For a Change," tied in with the theme Republicans were promoting nationally, "Vote Republican for a Change."

Early in the campaign, many observers assumed that Weber was leading his opponent. Baumann, however, gained ground and a September survey taken for the Weber campaign showed them in a close race. Although several crucial factors may have made a difference, the fact that Weber used television advertising and Baumann did not may have been important. In the past, television has not been used for congressional campaigns in the district. In order to reach a significant number of voters, the Weber campaign had to use many stations in many locations, including some which were out of state.

In the final results, Weber received 140,402 or 52.7% to Baumann's 126,173 or 47.3% of the vote. Baumann spent approximately $196,100, while Weber spent over $408,400 on the primary and general election campaigns.

Oklahoma 4: Howard Rutledge (R) vs. David McCurdy (D)

When Democratic Congressman Tom Steed announced his retirement early in 1980, he set the stage for the first real contest the district had seen in years. Although it is a very heavily Democratic area, the Democrats outnumber Republicans by nearly 6 to 1, it is also conservative in its political philosophy. Several times in the past, Republicans have come close to winning the district. In 1966, at a time when the GOP was making a strong showing statewide, Steed was reelected by only 364 votes. Although Jimmy Carter carried the district with 53.1%, his percentage was less than it should have been given the registration advantage of Democrats. This year, after a very short campaign, Republican Howard Rutledge lost to Democrat David McCurdy by 2,906 votes. Rutledge's late decision to enter the race, combined with McCurdy's intraparty problems following an acrimonious runoff, were clearly major factors in the race.

The fourth district is located in the southwestern corner of the state. It includes part of metropolitan Oklahoma City and extends to the state's southern border. The far southwestern part of the district is rural, old-line Democrat, and very conservative. Towards the north, however, the district becomes somewhat more marginal. The suburbs of Oklahoma City tend to vote Republican as does Cleveland County, which includes Norman and the University of Oklahoma. There are also three major military installations in or near the district, Altus Air Force Base, Tinker Air Force Base, and Fort Sill.

The heavy concentration of military personnel in the area made Howard Rutledge, 51, seem an attractive candidate for the district. He is a retired naval officer, and was a prisoner of war for seven years in Vietnam. He did not resign from the Navy until June 30 and announced his candidacy on July 1. Within three weeks, his original manager had resigned, causing further setbacks in an already short campaign. When David Muller, the new manager, arrived in August, he quickly placed major emphasis on raising Rutledge's name recongition. Rutledge had never run for public office before and was not known in the area. By the time of the primary on August 26, his name recognition had reached 15%. He easily defeated his only primary opponent, winning about 68.8% of the vote against David Hopper, who won 31.2%. Approximately 11,900 votes were cast in the GOP primary, whereas about 76,800 were cast in the Democratic primary.

David McCurdy, 30, is an attorney from Norman and was former Assistant State Attorney General. He was opposed in the Democratic primary by four other candidates, the most important of whom was State Rep. James Townsend, 52, Democratic majority leader in the Oklahoma House and chairman of the Democratic Caucus. Townsend was first elected to the House in 1965. He narrowly defeated McCurdy in the primary and forced him into a runoff, which took place on September 16. Shortly before the runoff date, McCurdy ran hard-hitting ads in the conservative, southwest part of the district strongly attacking Townsend for his pro-labor record. The ads were widely credited with giving McCurdy his narrow victory of 51.2%. Townsend supporters, who were very upset with McCurdy's tactics, pointed out that Townsend has a moderate rating from the Chamber of Commerce and a less than perfect rating from organized labor. The controversy led Townsend's campaign chairman to form a group called Democrats for Rutledge, which played an active role in the November race.

Immediately after the runoff, McCurdy clearly had a large lead over Rutledge, and apparently felt that the Democratic nature of the district would be sufficient to allow him to win. For the general election, Rutledge ran primarily a media campaign aimed at raising his name recognition, tying his name to Ronald Reagan's and attacking McCurdy as "wishy-washy" on the issues. McCurdy mostly did not react to Rutledge's attacks and continually emphasized what he could do as a Democrat in Congress.

The final vote totals were: 74,245 or 51% for McCurdy, and 71,339 or 49% for Rutledge. McCurdy spent about $222,000 on the entire campaign, including the primary and runoff. Rutledge spent approximately $146,700 on the primary and general elections.

Pennsylvania's 24th district: Congressman Marc L. Marks (R) vs. David DiCarlo (D)

When a Democrat challenges an incumbent Republican congressman, the usual assumption is that the Republican is the more conservative of the two. One might expect to see organized labor line up behind the Democrat, while business PACs support the Republican. The race in Pennsylvania's 24th district in 1980 broke the mold. Congressman Marc Lincoln Marks, who had cultivated a reasonably pro-labor voting record, had the endorsement of the United Labor Council of Erie County. David DiCarlo, a Democratic state legislator, had the support of the Business and Industry PAC, Fund for a Conservative Majority, and other groups which might normally support a Republican.

Congressman Marc Marks was elected in 1976, when he defeated Democratic incumbent Joseph Vigorito. The district has always been considered politically marginal, although the 1980 results clearly underscored the point. The 24th district is located in the northwest corner of the state and borders on Lake Erie. The city of Erie is a Democratic stronghold, as is the steel town of Sharon, located near Youngstown, Ohio. But other areas of the district, particularly Crawford County, tend to vote Republican. Although the 24th district was marginal for years, Joseph Vigorito was able to make it a relatively secure seat from 1964 until 1974, when his margin of victory slipped despite the Democratic trend nationally. After a primary challenge from Erie Mayor Louis Tullio in 1976, Vigorito won only 44% in the general election against Marks. Marks increased his margin from 56% in 1976 to 64% in 1978.

When Republican Senator Richard Schweiker announced his retirement in 1979, Marks made it clear that he was interested in the seat and began exploring a possible candidacy. At the same time, it was already noticeable that Marks' base of support in the district was not as secure as it could be. Beyond personality problems, the most frequently heard complaints against Marks related to his voting record and lack of interest in the district. Republican party leaders as well as members of the business community were making their dissatisfaction known. As one local observer noted, "Reactions to Marks ranged from indifference to hostility." Marks' senatorial ambitions only further aggravated local leaders who felt that their representative was more concerned about advancing his career than addressing their needs.

David DiCarlo, 35, is a four-term state representative from Erie County. Although he was known in part of the district, he had never run a district-wide campaign. As might be expected, the counties of Crawford and Mercer which are located to the south of Erie caused him the most difficulty in the campaign. His major effort was to portray Marks as too liberal for the district, and he particularly criticized his votes on spending issues. Marks did not respond to the charges and conducted a positive campaign for the most part.

The election results clearly revealed the strengths and weaknesses of both candidates. While Erie County, which is heavily Democratic and union oriented, gave DiCarlo an enormous 17,000 vote lead, Crawford County, a Republican area, gave Marks a 5,000 vote margin. Likewise, Mercer County, a Democratic area and Marks' home, gave the incumbent a 12,000 vote win. The final results were very nearly a tie. Marks received 86,687 votes while DiCarlo won 86,567, for a difference of 120 votes. While DiCarlo should have done better in the more Democratic Mercer County, he began the race as an unknown there. Marks should have made a stronger showing in Erie County, where organized labor had indicated it would help his campaign. Although the more than 80% turnout in Erie County could be one explanation for Marks' poor showing there, Reagan carried the county by 3,000 votes. Shortly after the election, Don Wilson, Marks' administrative assistant, commented, "If you look at the heavily union precincts, we were blown away. Union support was in name only. We got blitzed in the blue collar community far worse than we imagined." Neither Marks nor DiCarlo had any primary opposition. DiCarlo spent a total of about $123,300, while Marks spent approximately $148,500.

Utah's 1st District: Congressman Gunn McKay (D) vs. James Hansen (R)

Even though it was held by a Democrat from 1970 to 1980, Utah's first congressional district is considered the more conservative and Republican of the state's two seats. Despite the election of Rep. Gunn McKay in 1970, it continued to vote for statewide Republican candidates, and prior to 1970 it had been held by a Republican. Even in 1970 when the incumbent retired, it was assumed that GOP candidate Richard Richards would be the winner. McKay was the narrow victor, however, and he seemed fairly well entrenched by 1976, when he was reelected with 59% of the vote. But the 1978 election quickly reversed that perception. Running against an unknown Republican candidate whose campaign was not well organized, McKay was reduced to 51% of the vote. McKay attributed his poor showing to the fact only 178,000 people voted, as compared to 262,000 in 1976. The low turnout can be explained by the fact that there were no statewide races that year—a situation which occurs in Utah once every twelve years. Whatever may have been the cause of McKay's decline, survey data taken in 1980 showed that McKay had low name recognition and a low approval rating for an incumbent.

The first district is geographically one of the largest congressional seats in the country. It covers the entire eastern half of the state and circles around, but does not include, Salt Lake City. Because much of its vast area is thinly populated, campaigns tend to focus their attention on five major counties. Altogether, Utah, Weber, Davis, Cache, and Box Elder counties make up 79.4% of the district's total vote. All are located in the north, central part of the state. The district's two major population centers are separated by Salt Lake City. To the north are Davis County with its wealthy suburbs and Weber County which includes the city of Ogden, an important area for Cong. McKay. To the south of Salt Lake City is the other population center of the district, Utah County, which includes Provo, a Republican area. Provo is the home of Brigham Young University and the Osmonds. The district has many military installations, and defense issues played an important role in the 1980 election.

James Hansen, 48, was a four-term legislator and Speaker of the Utah House prior to his election to the first district congressional seat. He had opposition at the Utah Republican convention on June 29 from Jed Richardson, the 1978 nominee. Convention delegates gave Hansen 81% of the vote, enough for him to avoid a primary and become the party nominee. K. Gunn McKay, 55, was chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction. He is nephew of the late LDS President David McKay and a former aide to Governor Calvin Rampton (D). While in Congress, he did not always line up with northern liberal Democrats and was usually characterized as a moderate liberal.

The 1980 campaign between Hansen and McKay was very issue-oriented. Hansen, who began the race with low name recognition, focused on inflation, the economy, and the need for a change in Congress. Because of McKay's subcommittee chairmanship, Hansen also made heavy use of defense issues. During the campaign, McKay took advantage of his incumbency to make a number of announcements about projects of importance to the district.

For the most part, early surveys did not indicate how close the race would become for McKay. A poll taken by KUTV in Salt Lake City in July showed McKay leading Hansen 58% to 31% with 11% undecided. In September, a DMI survey taken for the Hansen campaign showed the Republican trailing McKay by 32%. That survey also indicated, however, that voters were definitely looking for an alternative to McKay and would support Hansen if they knew him.

Although there were five debates, the McKay campaign appeared fairly confident of victory until the end. When a publication entitled "The Real McKay" was distributed by the John Birch Society in the district, McKay strongly attacked Hansen. It was an independent expenditure, and Hansen refused comment on the pamphlet.

Aside from the extensive negative advertising done by the Hansen campaign, another very important element was its voter identification program. Through the combined efforts of the Republican party and the Hansen campaign, 13,000 people who were planning to vote for Senator Jake Garn (R) and Gunn McKay were identified. The campaign then targetted those voters for further contact in order to convince them to vote for Garn and Hansen. Hansen won the election by approximately 12,000 votes. Further, his victory was apparently unrelated to turnout. A total of 79% of the district's voters went to the polls, a record high. By comparison, the turnout in 1976 was 72%, and in 1978 it was 61%.

In the final, official vote totals, McKay received 144,459 votes or 47.9%. Hansen received 157,111 or 52.1% of the vote. McKay outspent Hansen, but only by a slight amount. Hansen spent approximately $222,800, and McKay spent $251,300.

CHAPTER II

The Art of Attracting Attention

Contrary to what most candidates believe, a contested primary is not a political liability. Among the campaigns represented at the conference, all of the winners had a contested primary, while all of the losers did not. Although it is not clear exactly why a primary campaign was helpful, it is possible that a primary amounts to a "trial run," giving the management a chance to test the productivity of volunteers, the effectiveness of certain methods of reaching the voters, and allowing time for corrective measures. It is very often the case that a candidate who is considering a race will approach a possible contributor using the argument that the campaign will not have the "drain" of a contested primary. "We can avoid dividing the party," he may say, "and we won't waste time and money we could be using against the November opposition." Although a primary may mean the loss of some early money, the least that can be said is that the advantages balance out the disadvantages. Based on the seven campaigns under consideration, however, it is very possible that a contested primary is a genuine asset. Even relatively late primaries did not seem to cause serious setbacks.

A second point which appears to be related to the existence of a contested primary is that the winners received early and abundant free press attention. Whether it was the fault of the candidate or the local press itself, losers were not able to interest reporters. The size of the media market and whether the district was urban or rural seemed to make little difference. In one case, even though the coverage was not positive because of issues the opponent was raising, it apparently did no harm in the long run. One possible reason for the importance of early press coverage was that it enabled the winning candidates to gain credibility sooner. The early news stories may have helped winners with fundraising and volunteers. In addition, when one newspaper covers a candidate, others may feel pressured to do likewise, creating even more attention. The existence of a contested primary, of course, would have been of interest to reporters. Whatever the reasons, those campaigns which could not get the local media interested well before October tended to lose.

Among the seven campaigns studied, the three which lost did not have contested primaries. Dennis McQuaid (R), who challenged Congressman John Burton (D), in California's 5th district, and David DiCarlo (D), who opposed Representative Marc Marks in the 24th district of

Pennsylvania, were unopposed on their primary ballots. Likewise, Congressmen Burton and Marks had no primary challengers. Republican Howard Rutledge who ran against Democrat David McCurdy in Oklahoma's 4th district had an opponent who was regarded as a minor candidate, and the campaign did not need to take the primary seriously.

On the other hand, David McCurdy who defeated Rutledge by 2,900 votes, had an altogether different situation. In the August 26 Democratic primary, he had four opponents, and from the outset he was not the favorite. State Representative James Townsend, a former majority leader of the Oklahoma House, was clearly expected to be the Democratic nominee. McCurdy, who portrayed himself as more conservative than Townsend, began the race as an unknown Norman attorney. When Townsend received 40.5% of the primary vote to McCurdy's 34.1%, a runoff became necessary. On September 16, McCurdy narrowly defeated Townsend with 51.2% of the vote, but his victory cost him a unified Democratic party. During the last weekend before the election, he ran ads in the southwestern conservative area of the district harshly accusing Townsend of being a tool of organized labor. The tactic outraged Townsend supporters who pointed to his moderate ratings with the local Chamber of Commerce and labor groups. Townsend's campaign chairman went on to form a "Democrats for Rutledge" committee which was quite active in the Republican's campaign. It had its own headquarters, filed its own FEC reports and undertook its own projects. Although the runoff created a very acrimonious situation and certainly was not helpful to McCurdy's campaign, the district is very heavily Democratic. If Rutledge had also had a primary in which he could have gained credibility and name recognition sooner, the natural Democratic edge McCurdy enjoyed would have been less significant.

Although a situation such as McCurdy had can develop out of a primary, it is the exception rather than the rule. Of the other winning campaigns, one could have gone in that direction but did not, in part, at least because the winner, Chuck Grassley, avoided attacking his opponent as much as possible. Grassley, who ran in Iowa against incumbent John Culver (D), was opposed by Tom Stoner, a moderate Republican, in the June 3 primary. Stoner began the campaign as the definite underdog and appeared to make some progress by attacking Grassley as too far to the right. The campaign created some repercussions within the party as moderate Governor Robert Ray endorsed Stoner, causing other leading Republicans to support Grassley. What some had thought would be a close election, however, was an overwhelming defeat for Stoner who received only 34.5% of the vote after outspending Grassley two to one. Apparently, Stoner was too harshly critical of his opponent. Surveys taken after the primary showed Grassley with broad Republican support despite the Stoner accusations. The primary apparently left Grassley few permanent scars. Governor Ray endorsed him late in the general election campaign and helped him increase his support among moderate Republicans who were then wavering, according to survey data.

In the other winning campaigns, the primaries were somewhat less controversial but were clearly of major significance. Republican Vin Weber in Minnesota's 6th district was challenged in the May 3 Independent-Republican district convention by two opponents, Al Johnson and Mildred Thymian. Weber won the nomination, but only after ten ballots. He had no serious opposition in the September 9 primary. Likewise Weber's November challenger, Archie Baumann, had a contested convention fight when the DFL district delegates met on May 4. After winning the nomination, he had some serious problems convincing pro-life DFLers that he would support their positions. Baumann's close association with retiring Congressman Richard Nolan (DFL), who had recently wavered on the abortion issue, was one major reason for his difficulty. The controversy clearly helped Weber gain some pro-life DFL support.

When Indiana Republican John Hiler entered the race against incumbent John Brademas (D), he expected to have no major opposition. Only a few days after he filed, however, another Republican who could attract major business and party support entered the race. Hiler, who was relatively new to politics, is from La Porte County, which contributes about 17% of the district's total vote. His opponent, Richard Pfeil, was from St. Joseph County, which accounts for about 50% of the district's vote. Although Pfeil should have been the favored candidate, Hiler's early use of television and ability to raise more money were contributing factors to his victory. Hiler's strong showing in La Porte and Elkhart Counties more than offset what Pfeil was able to do in St. Joseph County. Hiler won the May 6 primary with 57.9% of the vote. Pfeil received 38.2% and a third candidate won 3.9%. Although the final percentage might not indicate it, the Hiler campaign had to take the primary seriously, particularly since he and his advisors were new to politics.

State Representative James Hansen (R), Speaker of the Utah House, seemed the clear favorite over his Republican opponent, but he needed to win at least 70% at the June 29 convention in order to avoid a primary. Hansen's GOP challenger was Jed Richardson, who had been the 1978 nominee against Democratic incumbent Gunn McKay. Although Hansen seemed assured of a majority of the vote, winning 70% was a task which required organization. The campaign gave the convention its full attention for at least 45-50 days beforehand. His efforts finally yielded 81% of the vote, and he became the nominee without a primary.

Free press attention is something all campaigns want but many have a very difficult time achieving. The McQuaid campaign, for example, found that the San Francisco press was simply disinterested. Although the campaign had a press secretary, the person lacked experience, and, according to McQuaid, the campaign had a poor press relationship on the whole. Many of the campaign's activities which should have gotten attention at least in the local papers received no coverage. Congressman Burton, on the other hand, was able to keep his name in the major newspapers because of the six hearings he held on such controversial topics as nuclear waste, Social Security, the FAA, gay rights, BART, and offshore drilling. Further, of all the campaigns represented at the conference, McQuaid's was the only one which deliberately avoided mentioning economic issues in the paid media. The reason was the fear that use of such issues would link the campaign too closely with Paul Gann, the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate. California's 5th district is not a conservative area. It has a number of powerful unions, feminist groups are very active, and a large number of its voters identify themselves as liberals. As a result, the McQuaid effort was hampered by limits on the issues it felt it could use. As McQuaid put it, "It was a non-confrontational campaign." Negative media was used to attack Burton, but Burton did not respond. Since the press is known for its love of controversy, the lack of real confrontations, especially early in the campaign, and the absence of a relationship with local reporters were serious deficiencies.

Both David DiCarlo and Howard Rutledge also had problems with early press coverage. Rutledge's campaign manager told conference attendees that the media was not interested in the campaign until October. Although there were three debates, McCurdy did not otherwise discuss Rutledge's attacks. Only at the very end did McCurdy attack his opponent on issues affecting military personnel. Furthermore, the Rutledge campaign was primarily a media effort. Because he entered the race on July 1 and had no name recognition, Rutledge intended his media advertising to generate money and volunteers, as well as to build recognition. As the manager, David Muller commented, "Media is about all there was to the campaign." At the same time, major efforts were not made to send out press releases, although there were several press conferences for major events. In general, press attention was limited. The U.S. Senate race attracted far more interest.

Probably the most serious problem which faced Democrat David DiCarlo was a severe lack of funds. As a result, the campaign did not have anyone to deal with the press or even to monitor whether paid ads were being run on schedule. The lack of any primary opposition did not help the situation, and the local press did not give the race much coverage until late in the campaign. The three debates at the end of October did receive coverage, but Congressman Marks generally avoided his opponent and tried to run a positive campaign based on his incumbency and the need to have a Republican Congress working with a Republican President. Although DiCarlo held three or four news conferences, he basically visited with reporters when he was in their area. There was no consistent follow-up.

The contrast between the winning and losing campaigns on the matter of early press attention is just as clear cut as it was on the question of primaries. Weber, Hansen, Hiler, and Grassley received a good, consistent volume of press coverage which began pre-primary. In the case of the Weber and Baumann campaigns, they attacked each other regularly and with real vigor. According to Maria Malooly, Weber's campaign manager, they almost had a clipping war in progress, the victor being the candidate to get the most free press. The Weber campaign was also exceptional in another respect. Scheduling was carefully coordinated with advance press releases about campaign events which were coming up in local areas. Coverage of these events was actively sought and coordinated with the schedule on a regular basis.

Needless to say, the Iowa U.S. Senate race received a great deal of attention before and after the primary. But on the whole, the Grassley campaign, according to manager John Maxwell, did better advance work than Senator Culver's. Because of Culver's aggressive attacks in September, his issues were predominant until Grassley made his own vigorous counter-charges in a late September debate. Prior to that debate, which was the second held, reporters who came to Grassley's press conferences tended to ignore what Grassley said in order to ask him about Culver's issues, his involvement with the New Right and his failure to take a position on a statewide ERA referendum. After the debate, the Grassley economic issues became more predominant. In the last few weeks, Culver failed to bring up any new issues, and the Grassley campaign maintained its momentum while Culver's did not. Culver's attack during September on Social Security was very effective, according to Maxwell, but he "needed a follow-up punch."

For the John Hiler campaign in Indiana's 3rd district, press coverage came as soon as the media realized that for the first time in years, two viable Republicans were in a genuine primary to oppose Congressman Brademas. When the primary ended, Brademas himself helped to stir controversy in early September by attacking Hiler. An MOR survey taken for Hiler in July had shown him narrowly ahead, and Brademas' own polls may have indicated the same thing. In any case, his decision to attack created even more speculation that he was in serious trouble, especially since he had ignored his opponents in previous years. Although much of the newspaper and TV coverage was slightly biased against Hiler, these were not serious problems. Brademas generally got a greater volume of coverage.

While Brademas was busy attacking Hiler on a number of issues, Congressman McKay basically tried to ignore his opponent. He talked about his anti-inflationary efforts and the fact that as chairman of Military Appropriations Subcommittee he had cut the budget by 12%. Hansen countered that the United States did not need to cut the defense budget at that time. Since Hansen was Speaker of the Utah House and since he already had a good rapport with the press, he commanded a good volume of coverage, some favorable and some not. The campaign, however, had problems coordinating news releases, the schedule and the paid media. The press secretary, according to Howard Rigtrup, campaign manager, was better at handling the electronic than the print media. McKay also made use of his position in office to generate coverage of various announcements he made during the campaign about benefits to the district.

In many ways, McKay implied that there were no differences of substance between the candidates except that because he had seniority, he could deliver services to the district. It was only during the last ten days of the campaign that McKay attacked Hansen directly because of a booklet entitled "The Real McKay," which was distributed around the district by members of the John Birch Society. It was an independent expenditure over which Hansen had no control, and it had been distributed in the 1978 campaign without arousing any comment from McKay. The media covered McKay's charges, and reporters seemed convinced the issue had hurt Hansen. For his part, Hansen ignored the attack, refused to discuss it, and continued his own TV thrust against McKay.

Besides the importance of contested primaries and early press attention, another key element present in winning campaigns was their ability to engage their opponents in a genuine public exchange and make the race competitive. Winners were able to get the opposition to react to what they were saying and to address the issues. The losers were unable to get their opponents to recognize them, and the races were less competitive, at least verbally, as a result. As one conference participant put it, "It is the ability to draw the opponent out of his bunker where you can shoot at him." Perhaps one reason why winners were able to achieve real engagement with their challengers was the early press attention they had. When a campaign gets early and consistent press coverage, it is possible that the opponent feels increasing pressure to respond in some way to what he then perceives as a strong challenger. All of the campaigns studied, with the exception of Congressman Grassley's, were clearly trailing their opponents early in the race. When they were able to engage the opponent, the sense of competition greatly increased, and they gained momentum. Losers were unable to achieve that kind of momentum, despite their extensive paid media campaigns. For the campaigns studied, there was no such thing as "sneaking up on" the opposition.

The McQuaid campaign in San Francisco is probably the clearest example of a race which failed to engage the opponent. Because of the liberal tendencies of the district, the campaign was afraid to attack strongly on controversial issues. Burton regularly avoided McQuaid. A total of sixteen debates had been scheduled between Burton, McQuaid, and a Libertarian candidate. The incumbent attributed his absence to the hearings he was conducting, but the effect was to attract attention to the Libertarian and prevent McQuaid from directly confronting his real opponent. While Burton was using his incumbency to bring hearings to the area, his paid media promoted the idea that he was a hard-working, effective congressman. McQuaid attacked Burton for his poor attendance record and for failing to vote to expel Congressman Diggs. But the personal attack was apparently not strong enough to address the real concerns of the people of the district. At his coffees, McQuaid talked about economics and the practical effects of inflation. These themes were highly effective, and he attracted many more volunteers than he could actually put to work. Unfortunately, neither in the paid media nor in the free press did McQuaid really use issues against Burton which he could not ignore. As a result, the incumbent never felt a need to deal directly with McQuaid, except to label him a tool of the special interests. In the end, McQuaid came forward with no new issues other than his original ones, and his campaign apparently failed to peak at the end.

Both Howard Rutledge and David DiCarlo faced similar problems. Both ran extensive paid media campaigns. Unlike McQuaid, however, they did use economic and/or defense issues. Yet neither was able, for whatever reasons, to interest the local press in the campaign, and neither opponent could be drawn into a real discussion of the issues. Both Congressman Marks and David McCurdy attacked at the end. But their attacks, which took place in the paid media, were apparently aimed at strengthening their support among particular groups. Marks may have felt a need to be certain his labor and blue-collar groups stayed with him. As a result, he took out newspaper ads accusing DiCarlo of being a tool of anti-labor organizations and big oil. McCurdy may have wanted to reinforce his support among the military and so attacked Rutledge at the very end of the campaign on several issues of interest to military families. Such forays were not intended to engage the opposition in serious debate but to serve as last minute reinforcement.

Among the winners, probably the clearest example of opposition engagement was the campaign of John Hiler. By early September, Cong. Brademas began attacking Hiler in his paid media, in the free press, and through use of surrogates. While his positive themes represented the classic incumbency campaign—how he brought jobs and money to the district, how he had accomplished things in Washington and cut through red tape—his negative media set up a number of contrast issues. His first major attack, which took place on radio, TV and in the newspapers, accused Hiler of being a tool of big oil companies. Other issues were the Kemp-Roth bill, which Brademas said would be inflationary and not benefit the working man, and the Windfall Profits Tax. He stated that Hiler would not be able to bring money back to the district. Other ads attacked Hiler for having been endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce and for not being pro-labor. Brademas based his anti-labor charge on the fact that a union at one of the Hiler foundries had filed an unfair labor practices charge.

Hiler had been consistently attacking Brademas throughout the primary campaign. His extensive use of early television was very important to his primary win and rise in name recognition. He began his general election television advertising on August 1 with commercials about his family. They showed scenes from a very successful hog roast he had held to raise money. In early September, he used paid ads heavily attacking Brademas on spending issues and accusing him of being part of the House leadership. The general message was the "time for a change" idea. Hiler, who is Catholic, also made use of the abortion issue to targeted lists with direct mail.

Another issue which could have caused Hiler serious problems was the result of a congressional committee report which included one of his foundries on a list of the 250 worst polluters in America. The report received extensive coverage in the district, and it could have been quite damaging. Within a few weeks, however, committee staff admitted that it had been included erroneously. At that point, Hiler actually received favorable press coverage, and Brademas was unable to use the issue against him.

Although Brademas generally worked harder than Hiler to get free press coverage and may have gotten better results for it, Hiler did not have any problems getting coverage for his press conferences. Local reporters were quite interested in the race. The press was handled by Hiler's media director, who also wrote and directed all paid advertising. He did not hire a press director until October 1. Despite the fact that Brademas may have won the press "battle," Hiler did more than just make his presence felt. It appears that he effectively addressed the issues to the opponent so that he could not be ignored. The controversy created more press attention, and Hiler was able to get his message across. Surveys taken for the Hiler campaign indicated that Brademas was reinforcing his own supporters, but was not gaining among other voters. Clearly the fact that Brademas reacted as he did was quite important to the Hiler victory.

Among the other winning campaigns, James Hansen also attacked his opponent very strongly and consistently on the issues. But unlike Brademas, who countered with a major offensive of his own, McKay did not attack Hansen until the closing days of the campaign when he accused Hansen of unfair, last minute smear tactics. McKay's attack was based on the distribution of "The Real McKay" booklet, but since he had ignored it in 1978, he may have been attempting to reverse the trend in the polls favoring Hansen. Unlike Hiler, Hansen had been slow to gain name recognition, and in September the surveys probably suggested to McKay that he could continue his positive campaign through November 4. Brademas must have known by August that his opponent was making significant gains. On the other hand, David McCurdy and Marc Marks were also in very close races, yet they steadfastly refused to react except for their targeted ads on the last weekend.

McKay's response, however, came at the end of a very much publicized race, and it was a direct, personal attack. Up to that point, McKay's theme had been twofold: "McKay for the 80's" and "Preserve our way of life." The latter was supposed to be interpreted by the listener, whether it meant "our Mormon way of life," or "our environment," or whatever. It is a conservative district, and McKay seemed to avoid mentioning his party and associating himself with the leadership in Congress. His ads mentioned his various accomplishments and his concern about inflation and energy. He argued that he was for a strong national defense. Generally what he was asserting may have been aimed at directly undercutting Hansen's claims, just as Congressman Burton had done so effectively in California.

What may have made the difference, however, among other things, was Hansen's assertive use of the issues and his ability to get press coverage. Hansen's theme was "Time for a Change." His positive ads attempted to show Hansen as a credible, effective, experienced, moderate conservative alternative to McKay. The negative ads, which were used on radio and in the newspapers, dealt with defense, inflation and the economy. They asserted the need for a change in Congress because of proliferating staff and pay raises. Whenever McKay was criticized for his position on a particular issue, the ads quoted the entire array of votes on that issue and the total number of times McKay voted "wrong." Probably the most hard-hitting ad used by Hansen went on the air at the same time as McKay was trying to use "The Real McKay" to make Hansen look like an extremist. It began with the words, "What do you call a congressman who . . ." and continued with a litany of undesirable votes. It concluded with "You call him home." The consistency of Hansen's themes and the continuing press coverage set the stage for what happened in the closing days of the campaign. Although observers at the time maintained that the booklet issue hurt Hansen, it may have drawn McKay off course. Hansen refused to acknowledge it, and continued his campaign. Clearly Hansen was not responsible for provoking McKay, but if he had not laid the groundwork, the incumbent probably would have felt no compulsion to make his attack.

The campaigns of Vin Weber and Howard Rutledge took place in open districts. Yet, certain differences between them could not have been greater. While McCurdy felt he could ignore his opponent and be elected as a Democrat, Archie Baumann could afford no such hope. Baumann and Weber were continually exchanging volleys. Likewise the Grassley-Culver Senate race was continually generating controversy, as did all of the closely contested Senate races in 1980.

Certainly the fact that the Rutledge-McCurdy race took place in a heavily Democratic district, while the Weber-Baumann race occurred in a marginal seat, made some difference. Nevertheless, McCurdy had had a very divisive runoff which should have eliminated some of his natural advantage as a Democrat. McCurdy did not begin his television for the general election until about Oct. 20, and it was all positive. The emphasis on his being a Democrat and his endorsement by Senator David Boren probably were sufficient to give him the victory but were not strong enough to make his victory what it should have been. Rutledge ran a very extensive media campaign beginning in early September. His theme, "Time for a Change," combined with some of the negative ads, undoubtedly had a significant impact on the race and appears to have been a large part of what made it so close. But the paid media alone was insufficient to make up for the other missing ingredients.

In the case of the Weber-Baumann race, the exchange between the two candidates began early and continued until November 4. Their debates were given extensive news coverage, but the exchanges did not stop there. In typical Minnesota style, the confrontations were direct and often had strongly ideological overtones. Weber tried as much as possible to tie Baumann to former Congressman Nolan's liberalism and to President Carter's economic and defense problems. He backed up the accusations by quoting the Democratic platform. Baumann, on the other hand, attacked Weber for supporting Governor Reagan, who at the time was charged with being a warmonger. Baumann also asserted that Weber knew nothing about agriculture, which is very important to the district. But his two major issues against Weber were campaign spending and the special interests. Weber accused Baumann of supporting national health insurance and the capital gains tax. Other issues discussed in the campaign included ERA, abortion, the minimum wage, and OSHA. While Baumann used radio and newspaper ads, Weber used television as well, despite the fact that it had a rather poor cost/benefit ratio in his district.

During the course of the election, Baumann's accusations became more personal as he talked about Weber's ties to outside interest groups and his campaign expenditures. Weber did not respond to the charges and continued to stress his major issues, government spending, inflation, defense. Clearly all four winning campaigns, and particularly the congressional races, were aided directly or indirectly by the confrontations which occurred.

In the midst of all the three color brochures, billboards, cartops, buttons, signs, tabloids, and the other promotional gear that inevitably come with every campaign, it is easy to forget the candidate himself. So much attention is usually focused on the media aspects of a campaign that the candidate is often pushed to the sideline, while analysts talk about the timing of a particular negative ad or the distribution of a door-to-door piece. In some respects, examining the differences between winning and losing campaigns from the standpoint of the candidate is more difficult than studying other campaign "functions." Questions of image projection and theme are more intangible than phone banks and direct mail. Nevertheless, some broad distinctions between successful and unsuccessful campaigns did emerge at the conference.

Among the races studied, differences in theme were important. A number of winning candidates used the idea of "working for . . ." or "hard working . . ." Those incumbent candidates who lost strongly emphasized their leadership abilities and what they could bring back from Washington. The individual candidate's theme should not be considered in isolation, however. The ideas which the opponent was trying to portray about himself also have a bearing on what constitutes a successful theme. In general, those campaigns which were more assertive than the opposition in projecting the candidate's image were more successful than those which tended to be reactive.

Apart from image and posturing, the aggressive use of issues was another important factor. Winning and near winning campaigns attacked their opponents on substantial, national issues. The campaign which avoided those issues and criticized the opponent's personal integrity had difficulty making an impact.

A brief review of the campaigns shows that three successful candidates—Congressmen Marks, Burton, and Grassley—used the theme "working for . . ." or "hard working . . ." On the other hand, incumbents Brademas, McKay and Culver apparently reinforced the idea that they were part of the system by stressing what they had brought to the district from Washington.

A look at the opposition campaign themes is also revealing. Of all the campaigns, perhaps the least assertive effort was that of Dennis McQuaid. Because of the survey research, McQuaid used a personal attack against Burton, implying that he lacked integrity because of his absentee record and failure to vote on certain matters. But apparently the attack themes were not strong enough to address the voters' real concerns. The campaign had to leave its negative ads on the air far longer than originally planned because it reached a plateau it could not overcome. Also, McQuaid's positive themes—that he "cares" and "would be a congressman you can be proud of"—were weaker than Burton's "hard working" and "effective" ideas.

The other more narrowly losing campaigns, DiCarlo and Rutledge, avoided personal attacks and strongly emphasized national issues. David DiCarlo tried to portray himself as younger and more experienced than Marks. Congressman Marks, on the other hand, maintained that he was "hard working." He also stressed that he was a Republican and Reagan needed more Republicans in Congress. Marks' themes may have been slightly more compelling, but DiCarlo's heavy emphasis on economic concerns and the fact that Marks was too liberal may have balanced out any advantage the incumbent had.

John Culver's theme, "A fighter for Iowa," may not have been as effective as "Grassley works for Iowa." Grassley was trying to present himself as sincere, honest, and hard working. His ads drew heavily from his Iowa background, and his first media flight made extensive use of testimonials. Culver was portraying himself as a "tough guy" who would fight for the state in Washington. At the same time, he used his family in some of his advertising, perhaps to balance the aggressive image he was trying to achieve and to show he was in touch with the state. While Culver tried to portray Grassley as incapable of the job as U.S. Senator, he also tried to show that he was the tool of outside interests. Grassley, however, directly attacked Culver for being part of the system and was particularly critical of current economic policy set by Democrats in Washington. According to Grassley surveys, Culver's major attack issues, big oil and the New Right, were simply not effective. Although the electorate has very negative attitudes toward oil companies, apparently Grassley's issues, excessive spending and Culver's liberalism, were far more of a motivating factor this year. In the end, the Culver campaign seemed to undergo a major strategy shift. Culver had begun to campaign by asserting his liberalism, but ended by trying to sound more conservative, especially on defense issues.

John Hiler, Vin Weber, and James Hansen did not use the idea "hard working" in their positive themes. All three were attempting to project the image of a capable, experienced, effective community leader. All three also strongly emphasized the need for a change in Washington. Both Hiler and Hansen directly attacked their opponents as representatives of what was wrong in Congress. Both McKay and Brademas campaigned in such a way as to emphasize their role in Washington as part of the system. While McKay was using the theme, "McKay for the 80s," Hansen was saying, "If you liked what you got in the 70's, keep it. But if not . . ." Weber's themes, "For Us" and "For a Change," may have been roughly equal to or slightly more effective than Baumann's "he fits the district." While Weber was presented as experienced, capable, and knowledgeable on the issues, his weakness was that he occasionally seemed too intellectual and distant. He was also 28 years old and had been away from the district for some time. Baumann, 57, wanted to appeal to the common man and project a warm, family image which would make him attractive to farmers. His major problem, however, was a seeming lack of depth on issues. From the standpoint of image alone, Weber had some very serious potential problems. He overcame them on the strength of other aspects of the campaign, including the issues he used.

In the other open district, Howard Rutledge clearly defeated his opponent in the theme war. His use of his experience and "time for a change" were probably more compelling than McCurdy's emphasis on being a Democrat who would be part of the majority party. On the other hand, the nature of the district is such that the appeal to party loyalty was important because of the heavily Democratic registration. For that reason, the theme kept McCurdy somewhat competitive long enough to counterbalance Rutledge's inroads. Rutledge, of course, had his own problems, including his late entry into the race. He was also unaccustomed to dealing with a civilian population, and he was reluctant to do some of the tasks normally imposed on a candidate. These weaknesses were mostly overcome by the last weeks of the campaign, but since there was so little time anyway, they may have played a role in McCurdy's victory.

CHAPTER III

Strategy, Management and Internal Functions

No campaign for public office functions in a vacuum, isolated from other races, candidates and the general political atmosphere of the given election year. So important are these relationships with factors external to the campaign that one of the major areas explored at the conference was their impact on winners and losers. Quite a number of possible outside influences were examined, including the role of the national, state and local parties; the relationship with other campaigns; independent expenditures; special interest groups and coalitions; campaign schools; political action committees; and the candidacy of John Anderson. After careful study, four major areas of difference were found between successful and unsuccessful campaigns.

First, all four winners participated in some way with voter registration drives. The losers tended to make little or no effort in this area. Second, the winners worked with other campaigns, whether they were state legislative, gubernatorial or senatorial. The joint project may have been a fundraiser, the exchange of survey data, door-to-door literature drops or election day activities. The unsuccessful campaigns, for whatever reasons, had minimal contact with other races. Another factor was that winners who did get involved with a major cooperative effort, such as voter identification and turnout, essentially took the primary responsibility for it, and they often controlled it. In effect, the project almost ceased to be an external factor to the campaign's operations. The same was true of voter interest groups, such as realtors or sportsmen. Winners basically guided their activities from within the campaign, and the losers usually did not.

Beyond these differences, conference participants also examined the strategies of the campaigns as they related to building support among diverse groups in order to form winning coalitions. At a time when increasing attention is being given to coalition politics, the importance of using the best strategic approach is more and more vital to a candidate's ultimate success or failure. A study of the campaigns represented at the conference showed that the coalition strategies of the winning as opposed to the losing campaigns were quite different. For the sake of clarity, the strategies were divided into three groups. The first, which was labelled the Percent-Vote Approach, involved estimating the exact percentage of votes desired from interest groups in the district who should be attracted to the candidate. Specific vote goals were set for each and specific plans for reaching those voters were drawn up. The total would add up to more than the projected total number of votes necessary to win the campaign.

Percent-Vote Approach

Vote Goal — 95,000

75% Blue Collar	25,000 Votes
60% Elderly	32,000 Votes
70% Veterans	27,000 Votes
60% Right to Life	20,000 Votes
	104,000 Votes

A second strategic approach was called the Combination Strategy. The calculations would be based on winning a certain percentage of the vote from ticket-splitters plus the usual party groups. Further work would be done to establish which voter interests in each category need to support the candidate.

Combination Strategy

90% GOP	20% Vote
35% Democratic	25% Vote
60% Ticket-Splitters	10% Vote
	55% Vote

60% Ticket-Splitters
  Blue Collar
  Catholic
  Youth
  Women, 35-45 Educated Housewife

The final technique for coalition building involved a different concept. Labelled the Shotgun Approach, the strategy would simply call for activities designed to attract as many interest groups as possible. The campaign would work with all those that showed a desire to be helpful.

The number of votes expected from the groups would not be calculated.

Shotgun Approach

Groups

Ideological	*Peer Groups*
Right to Life	Homeowners
Moral Majority	Farmers
Eagle Forum	Realtors
National Rifle Association	Doctors
	Lawyers
	Dentists

At first glance, the plans which appear preferable are the Percent-Vote and Combination strategies. The campaign which has decided specifically which kinds of voters it expects to attract would have done extensive survey research. It would have established detailed plans for developing relationships with these groups and might have included such plans in its budgeting. A Shotgun Approach campaign might do some of the same work, but it would not focus its activities so much on a specific audience of voters. As one manager explained it, "We went after every vote we could get."

Actually, as logical and precise as the first two plans are, all of the successful campaigns studied used the Shotgun Approach. The three losing campaigns employed the Percent-Vote, Combination strategies or, in one case, a simple precinct breakdown. Although all the methods are good concepts, perhaps the secret of the success of the Shotgun plan lies in its greater flexibility. With the other strategies, there is little fall back alternative after a certain point in the campaign is reached. If the targetted audience is not attracted to the campaign, or if the opponent can draw it away, the prospects for victory may be seriously diminished. Current, usable lists must be obtained and mailed. The survey data on which the projections are based must be accurate. The manager's estimation of the candidate's ability to appeal to the groups, versus the opponent's, must be correct.

By contrast, the Shotgun method means approaching every possible group. At the outset, the campaign might concentrate primarily on name recognition, credibility and winning press coverage. Then, as mailings begin to go out and as all the efforts gain momentum, more and more groups are naturally attracted to the campaign. At that point, those which are responding the best can be put to work in one capacity or another. The other two coalition approaches are very much more focused. The targetted elements of the coalition must be brought into the campaign. If they are not, these strategies leave little room for late adjustment. Altogether, the more specific the coalition plan, the more difficult it appears to be to execute.

Of the losing races, probably the best example of an attempted Percent-Vote strategy was the Rutledge campaign. As part of the original plan, it was determined that three target groups were essential for a Rutledge victory. If certain percentages of farmers, military and youth could be convinced to vote Republican, the campaign would win. Not only were specific percentages calculated, but methods for developing rapport with the groups and specific budget figures were established. According to the plan, each coalition group was to conduct its own independent campaign ("Farmers for Rutledge," for example). According to manager David Muller, the plan would have worked "if we had had six months to execute it." Rutledge announced his candidacy on July 1. His first campaign manager left after a few weeks, and Muller started in early August. Because there were three months to execute a complete campaign, it was treated as if it were a special election.

By the end of September, Muller realized that there would not be enough time to carry out the plan in all its details. Instead, the resources which were to be put into the original coalition approach were channeled to Democrats for Rutledge. By early October, it opened its own headquarters and began its activities. Since the original groups undoubtedly were heavily Democratic, it was assumed that Democrats for Rutledge would accomplish some of the same objectives in a more general fashion.

Beyond its problems with the Percent-Vote Approach, the Rutledge campaign had no real connection with other campaigns in the state. U.S. Senate candidate Don Nickles was not organized in the district, according to Muller, and the Reagan campaign existed in name only. Although Rutledge made heavy use of a Reagan endorsement ad, that was the extent of their cooperation. The Rutledge campaign did provide some volunteers for registration drives done in several areas by the county Republican parties. It had access to the names of the new voters and undertook follow-up mailings. Other campaigns studied, however, were more extensively involved in voter registration.

Of the two other losing races, the McQuaid campaign also calculated the votes it would need based on the Percent-Vote model. Included in its figures were specific goals for a number of groups, including homosexuals. It is estimated that the district has approximately 60,000 gay voters. The campaign attempted to prevent them from voting for Burton as a bloc. In order to achieve his vote goal, McQuaid spent a significant amount of time talking to gay organizations and seeking their endorsements. David DiCarlo, on the other hand, did not have a strategy for building coalitions. All of his efforts were focused on the target precincts.

Although he had the support of various groups, including physicians, dentists, realtors, home builders, as well as right to life and conservative PACs, he did not involve outside groups heavily in his campaign. Both McQuaid and DiCarlo had few dealings with other races. The DiCarlo campaign was able to share polling data with local races, but it apparently had few, if any, other joint projects.

While Howard Rutledge and Dennis McQuaid had specific vote goals for particular interest groups, the campaigns of Vin Weber, John Hiler, James Hansen and Chuck Grassley did not limit themselves to such projections. Their objective was to get as many votes from each group as possible. Vin Weber, for example, divided his coalition into a number of categories, including farmers (dairy, crop, cattlemen, pork, turkey growers); veterans; small business; pro-life; gun-owners and sportsmen; youth; professionals (doctors, dentists, chiropractors); senior citizens; and women. These groups were approached through direct mail. Advisory committees were set up for each and position papers were developed. Among all the groups, Weber probably did the poorest among women, who were apparently included in the coalition groups Baumann was trying to reach. His coalition probably consisted of teachers, labor, public employees, women, and farmers' union members.

Although the Weber campaign deliberately limited its contact with some other races, the reason was a matter of control. It did, however, share literature drops, door knocking, blitzes, and survey results with other legislative campaigns. It also cooperated with the state party's voter identification and turnout plan, as well as its registration drive. When the plans for the phone bank were drawn, Weber manager Maria Malooly made adjustments in it. She established the priority precincts she needed to have called first. The phone bank was a cooperative effort involving all the Minnesota campaigns, but in the 6th district, Weber fieldmen were responsible for overseeing the project, even though they did not actually control it.

Like the Weber campaign, the Hansen effort also used the Shotgun Approach. Because the district has been the more Republican of Utah's two seats, the campaign focused on ensuring that Republicans voted a straight ticket. Through a voter identification program jointly operated by the state party, the Jake Garn for U.S. Senate and the Hansen campaigns, 13,000 people who were planning to vote for Garn and McKay were identified. The Hansen campaign also organized letter writing by peers to such groups as attorneys, doctors, veterinarians, farmers and home builders. McKay concentrated on teachers and labor unions, including steelworkers and miners.

As in the Hansen race, the John Hiler campaign in Indiana also cooperated with a statewide identification program, known as Team 80.

Making extensive use of computers, the campaign identified voters for gubernatorial candidate Robert Orr, U.S. Senate candidate John Quayle, and John Hiler. Although other campaigns assisted, the program in the 3rd district was really under the control of the Hilers. Joint appearances were also arranged for Quayle and Hiler in order to encourage straight ticket voting.

Hiler's winning coalition consisted of a number of groups in the district, including businessmen, Catholics, youth, home builders and realtors. But in a more general sense, Hiler's target group was anyone who had voted Republican in previous elections who had also voted, one way or the other, in the congressional race. The campaign's ability to reach these voters was based on its implementation of voter identification, turnout and election day programs. Those programs were executed for the most part because of the substantial volunteer organization Hiler had. In addition, the campaign did not neglect some voter groups which might ordinarily be considered hostile. Because it was essential to reduce losses in St. Joseph County, which is heavily ethnic and union-oriented, the campaign set up a Labor for Hiler committee. The campaign mailed about 12,000 letters which described Hiler's pro-life views to active Catholics in the county. When Ralph Abernathy came to the district on October 28 to speak on Hiler's behalf, "Join Ralph Abernathy" leaflets were distributed at black churches in South Bend. An election day ballot security program was also established in certain areas.

In Iowa, the Grassley campaign was counting on a number of components to make up its coalition, and although it monitored those components through its survey data, it used the Shotgun Approach. For obvious reasons, Grassley wanted to carry his former congressional district by a large margin. Statewide, he hoped to win 90% of the Republican vote. He based that figure on the fact that Roger Jepsen had received 80% of the registered GOP vote in 1978. Other coalition groups included Catholics, blue collar workers, switch Democrats, farmers, and senior citizens. Many independent expenditures were also made for Grassley, so that gun owners, Moral Majority, and right to life support could also be added to his coalition. Probably the most important of the outside expenditures was done by the National Rifle Association. It mailed approximately 130,000 letters to its members and to all licensed hunters in the state, and also distributed bumper stickers. The effect of their activities was immediately seen by the Grassley campaign, which received a strong response from gun owners.

Although the campaign had made plans to carry out its own voter identification and turnout programs, it was decided in June to combine efforts with those of the state party. Phone banks were set up in the major counties. The cooperative plan worked fairly well, except that the campaign had difficulty getting the names of voters who were supporting Grassley only. The Grassley campaign also coordinated with the state party on voter registration, but outside efforts to register voters were also made by Moral Majority. Because a U.S. Senate campaign is naturally a great deal more complex than a House race, it may be that it is impossible to attempt a simple Combination or Percent-Vote Approach. In any case, the Grassley campaign found that the less restrictive Shotgun strategy was successful.

If there is one outstanding problem which seems to plague all political campaigns at whatever level, it is turnover in management. Any candidate seeking office who has had to replace managers can probably give a long list of reasons why that change hurt the campaign. Unfortunately, an equal number of candidates who wanted to hire someone else but stopped short of it can also explain how their "incompetent" managers cost them the election. Next to the candidate himself, the manager is the single most important asset or liability a campaign can have, and no discussion of successful or unsuccessful campaign techniques is adequate without a look at the management.

Among the campaigns represented, five of the seven began with one manager and ended with another. In all probability, such a high rate of turnover among even the leading, targetted races in the country is not peculiar to this group. What is significant, however, is that the losing campaigns were more likely to have had a shift in management than were the winners. Further, when there was a change, successful campaigns usually had fewer subsequent adjustment problems than did losers. When questions arose as to the need for further staff changes, managers of winning campaigns tended to take quick, decisive action one way or the other. Managers who procrastinated were often associated with losing races. In terms of the manager's relationship to the candidate, the crucial difference was whether or not they had complete confidence in each other. When that trust was lacking, the campaign clearly suffered.

Another distinction between winners and losers related to strategy and its implementation. However innovative or ordinary the strategy may have been, managers of winning campaigns carried it through. When problems arose, they solved them. In short, nothing stopped their determination to implement the campaign plan. The managers of losing campaigns failed to remove fundamental obstacles and as a result certain aspects of the basic strategy were not implemented.

In addition, conference participants considered the question, "What are the qualifications of a good manager?" Oddly enough the correlation between success and political experience which is so often taken as an absolute given did not exist. Several managers of successful campaigns had had no previous experience in politics. Rather, their talent was their ability to follow through in detail. The successful managers, some of whom had been with government or private industry for years, were good implementers, not necessarily old-hand political veterans.

Lastly, campaign managers from all seven campaigns were asked to account for their time. They were asked to assign a percentage to each of nine general functions which are usually part of a campaign. The results, given below, reflect only the amount of time the manager himself spent on that particular item, not how important it was to the total effort. Two observations were made based on the chart. First, fundraising occupied far more managerial time than most conference participants had expected to be the case. In fact, with only one exception, it took as much or more time than any other campaign function. The second conclusion was based on the observation that only losing managers of congressional campaigns had assigned zeros to certain functions. Since a U.S. Senate race is such a complex undertaking, the campaign is likely to be far more specialized, and one person almost certainly could not be involved in all its aspects. In a congressional race, however, the manager who is not in touch with the whole effort may be sacrificing a crucial aspect of the campaign.

Percentage Breakdown of Manager's Time

	External	**Fundraising**	**Volunteers**	**Schedule**	**Press**	**Candidate**	**Media**	**Voter Indentification**	**Research**
Rutledge	15	15	5	10	10	20	20	0	5
Hiler	5	30	20	5	5	5	5	20	5
Hansen	1	25	35	20	5	4	8	2	10
McQuaid	15	20	5	5	10	15	15	10	5
DiCarlo	0	45	25	3	2	10	17	0	5
Weber	5	25	5	20	10	10	20	2	3
Grassley	5	35	0	2	7	0	35	5	10

A comparison of the seven campaigns in terms of their management produces some interesting results. There is no mistaking the fact that the unsuccessful campaigns had more managerial problems of a far more severe nature than did the others. The David DiCarlo race is a good example of what can happen when only volunteers are running a campaign. Originally, DiCarlo had planned to hire a manager in June. When the manager was delayed for five weeks, the candidate waited only to find that when he did arrive they absolutely could not work together. After reviewing the fundraising situation, DiCarlo decided he could not afford to hire another manager, nor did he know anyone else he could bring in to do the job. As a result, the candidate was also the campaign manager. None of the staff was paid, and although the campaign had three headquarters in each of three counties, there were coordination problems. Further, he found that his volunteers were not accountable, and, of course, they could not be fired. DiCarlo told conference participants, "If I would have had 50% of my time to be the candidate, I would have won." Congressman Marks, on the other hand, had professional consultants and a paid staff.

Certainly one of the major difficulties DiCarlo encountered was that he could not implement all of his original strategy. His plan had, for instance, called for a voter identification and turnout program with phone banks. Because of his schedule, he was completely unable to implement that aspect of the plan. When asked what changes he would make in future races, DiCarlo told conference participants he would have a paid manager and staff in three campaign offices, as well as a paid media director.

A second campaign which had serious management problems was that of Dennis McQuaid. The campaign had a volunteer manager who, according to McQuaid, was very good at strategy but not at execution. The manager did not get involved in the day to day details. There was a campaign calendar, but the manager did not enforce deadlines. Instead, a coordinator was hired to work under the manager's direction to do all implementation. Although the system might have worked in theory, actually the coordinator had all the responsibility and none of the authority. That separation caused ineffective leadership. Although the candidate had been personal friends with the manager for some time, McQuaid told conference participants he knew there were problems but he failed to address them effectively. Because of the weakness in the management, aspects of the campaign plan were not implemented. In particular, McQuaid had been recruiting many volunteers at coffees. The plan had called for voter identification and extensive turnout efforts in Marin County. Because the manager delayed setting up a volunteer structure early in the campaign, he was unable to do it later due to other activities. As a result, many of the volunteers could not be put to work.

The Howard Rutledge campaign also had its share of problems, but most of them were related to the short time frame in which the manager was working. The first manager was hired in early July, but left three weeks later. David Muller arrived in early August to find that virtually nothing had been accomplished. He had to draw up the complete campaign plan and calendar. The severe shortage of time led to other problems. The strategy of attracting a coalition of youth, farmers and military to Rutledge could not be executed, and a major change of plans took place. A further problem was that the candidate wanted to have input into the day to day operations of the campaign. He would often try to tell individual staff members exactly what they should do and how. According to Muller, it took a while for him to develop a good rapport with the candidate but that by the end of the campaign the relationship had become a very positive one. Unfortunately, since the Rutledge effort was a two month campaign, those initial problems were a serious setback.

Among the winning campaigns, two had management changes, Grassley and Weber. Of the two, the Weber campaign seemed to have more problems because of the turnover. The new manager, Maria Malooly, began on June 1, 1980, shortly after the convention. She had worked prior to that for one of Weber's opponents, Mildred Thymian. Malooly, who was hired by a committee, was not immediately accepted by the staff, which was in place when she came, nor by the candidate. She found that the staff was unaccustomed to accountability, and other internal disagreements developed. Finally there was a direct confrontation between Malooly and the candidate in July and from that point an understanding was reached. Although Weber often disagreed with his schedule and occasionally tried to become involved in decision making, he had a good working relationship with Malooly, who remained in control of the campaign. Clearly if the internal difficulties had not been quickly resolved, they would have been a serious drain on the Weber effort. There were no major strategy changes, except for some tactical adjustments, and the campaign plan was executed.

For the Grassley campaign, the management changeover came immediately after the primary, on June 3rd. It was, however, a relatively smooth transition. John Maxwell, the new manager, had participated in early strategy plans drawn up for Grassley, and he was already familiar to some degree with the campaign. The previous manager, who had been Grassley's press secretary in Washington, moved to another position on the staff. The management shift did provoke some negative press coverage. As a result, Maxwell made no more staff changes than he had to, and they were made quickly. The strategy itself was carefully based on survey research and although there were several tactical adjustments, the plan was implemented in detail and the calendars were conscientiously followed. The relationship between Grassley and Maxwell was one of complete confidence. In fact, Grassley involved himself so little in the campaign decisions that Maxwell expressed a desire to have had more input from the candidate.

The two remaining campaigns, those of Hansen and Hiler, were unique in various ways. In the case of the Hansen race, manager Howard Rigtrup had known the candidate for years and had been a next door neighbor. Despite a few occasions where tensions developed, there was never any question of a management change. The Hiler race was unique in that it had no individual manager. Larry Hiler, the candidate's brother, was in charge of field operations and administration. Although his job resembled that of a campaign manager, the campaign actually had a management team, rather than an individual in charge. The decision-making team consisted of a campaign coordinator, who worked on media; Larry Hiler; and a comptroller, Bob Hiler, also a brother of the candidate. Regular coordinating meetings were held on Sundays and, according to Larry Hiler, the system worked very well. There were no personality clashes and the team had the confidence of the candidate. It was patterned after the way the Hilers run their foundries. Each person had specific areas of responsibility. Fundraising was divided between the entire team. For both the Hansen and Hiler races, the individuals involved in the management had had no previous experience running a campaign. Howard Rigtrup had been a logistics manager for the U.S. Air Force for many years. Larry Hiler was one of the managers of the family foundries.

Both campaigns consistently executed their strategies, making no major changes or omissions. Adjustments were made in tactics. In the Hansen campaign, when staff changes were necessary, Rigtrup acted very quickly to solve the problems. He was even criticized on occasion for acting too quickly. Although the Hiler campaign was rather decentralized, an enormous amount of work was done with volunteers. From organizing several large-scale fundraisers to putting out mailings to operating the phone banks, the campaign made full use of its 1,500 volunteers. Altogether, 750,000 pieces were mailed by volunteers, working out of eleven campaign headquarters.

Closely related to the topics of mangement and internal control is the area of voter identification and turnout. No one would deny that it is one of the less glamorous aspects of campaigning. Everyone loves to talk about advertising strategies or about the latest televised debate, but precinct organization is considered to be just too technical, too dull. At the same time, creating an efficient organization to handle identification and turnout on election day is probably one of the most challenging tests of a manager's ability. A campaign which can effectively coordinate and utilize its volunteers has an invaluable asset. Campaigns are won sometimes solely on the basis of media, but the failure to develop volunteer support can turn a victory into defeat at the next election.

The conclusions reached by conference participants on the topic of voter turnout and precinct organization have been heard before. But the fact that they are not new underscores their validity. The successful campaigns generally had some form of voter identification and turnout, while losing campaigns did not. The argument was often heard in 1980 that because it was a presidential election year, turnout would be high. For this reason, it was said, any identification and turnout efforts would be futile because more than likely those contacted would vote anyway. The best thing to do, therefore, would be to concentrate on recognition and media. Actually, several campaigns which attended the conference noticed a clear difference in their favor where a turnout program on election day was implemented. Further, as noted before, a precinct program was an element in the winning campaigns. The winning races had made an early commitment to develop a program, and they had the staff capability to carry it out.

Further, the successful races used mail to follow-up to the voters they had contacted. The process of identification was mostly done by use of telephones among the campaigns. Some turnout efforts were door to door, while others used phone calling as well.

Of the successful campaigns, the one which had the most exceptional precinct program was the Hiler race. Altogether 105,000 favorable Hiler voters were identified by election day. The process of finding those voters involved heavy use of an in-house computer and a number of phone banks throughout the district. The Hiler campaign worked directly with the Team 80 effort, but it did the planning and implementation, and supplied most of the volunteers. Although some identification work was done door to door, most was done through phoning. As undecideds and other target groups, including ticket-splitters, were identified, extensive follow-up mailings were done through use of the computer. On election day, volunteers reached 20,000 homes by going door to door. Other parts of the district were telephoned. In the final analysis, Hiler won by about 18,800 votes. Campaign projections showed them winning by 18,000. The turnout in the district was 79%. They had expected a 74% turnout.

Of the other winning campaigns, the Hansen effort made very effective use of follow-up mail. Working jointly with the Jake Garn for U.S. Senate campaign, phone banks were set up in the key counties of the district. The Garn campaign supervised the calling, and the Hansen campaign supplied volunteers. By early October substantial partial results were available. At that point, Hansen's own phone bank went to work calling the 13,000 people who were for Garn and McKay. An advocacy script was used, and Rigtrup reported 40% conversion rate. In addition, follow-up materials were hand delivered by volunteers directly to the voter.

Then on October 27, the 13,000 ticket splitters received a hand addressed letter from Sen. Garn asking them to vote for Hansen. On October 30, a mailgram from President Ford was sent to the 13,000 plus another 3,000 identified Republicans also asking for a Hansen vote. The Hansen campaign had planned no effort on election day. As it turned out, however, the excitement and momentum dictated a last minute effort to organize hostess phoning. The McKay campaign also set up phone banks for voter identification using paid callers. Voters were asked candidate preference and issue concerns. Later they received personal looking follow-up letters on the subject of their concern. While McKay's efforts may have been helpful to his campaign, certainly the targetted mailings done by Hansen were a very important contributing factor to his victory. The campaign did not calculate vote goals at the precinct level, but it did target areas and color code them. County-wide vote goals were established and they proved to be almost unbelievably close to the mark. The campaign calculated that it needed 156,987 votes to win. It received 157,111. It had about 1,100 active volunteers who covered 722 out of 909 precincts.

The contrast between the winning and losing campaigns on the subject of precinct work and voter turnout is quite obvious. David DiCarlo was unable to implement his formal plan due to time and financial handicaps. Likewise, Howard Rutledge did not have a very active program. The campaign plan had called for an advocacy phone bank from September 16-29. Then from September 30 to October 30 phoners were to identify the pro-Rutledge vote. That plan was not implemented, in part because of the conviction that the turnout would be so high anyway in a presidential year that achieving name recognition was more important. There were some hostess phones set up in targetted counties. The McQuaid campaign suffered from party and managerial problems. The San Francisco party central committee had promised to do identification and turnout in that part of the county located in the fifth district. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, that work was left undone. Further, the McQuaid campaign did not detect the problem until it was too late to organize its own efforts. In Marin County, however, the campaign worked to increase the McQuaid vote by a combination of door to door and phone efforts. Area chairmen, precinct and block captains were recruited. Altogether, about 20,000 pro-McQuaid voters were identified in Marin County, and they were contacted on election day. As McQuaid told conference attendees, "Where we had good precinct people it shows in the election results." According to McQuaid, there were enough volunteers to have done a great deal more, but they were not given assignments. "We had the people," McQuaid said. "We lacked the management structure." Both the manager and the consultant doubted that enough volunteers could be recruited in the district. No such organizational work had been done in the area for years. Further, it was felt that a media campaign would be the key element in a McQuaid victory.

Besides voter identification and turnout, there are, of course, many other internal operations of a campaign which could be studied. Survey research and fundraising are certainly two essential functions of any viable political campaign. Although both areas were examined for significant differences between the races, no substantial differentiating points were found. All of the campaigns were recognized as possibly winning races fairly early, and for this reason most were on target lists of one kind or another. There was never any question then as to their potential viability. Some, it is true, had more difficult districts, but all were considered campaigns to watch for 1980.

All the campaigns utilized survey research. Some spent significant sums of money on it, and others spent very little. Some had tracking done professionally. Others did not. But no single factor could be identified to distinguish the campaigns. Likewise in fundraising, which is an absolutely essential activity, and which occupied a great deal of managerial time, significant differences between winners and losers could not be found. One of the most common problems was the very late arrival of money from political action committees. Many campaigns received a very large portion of their total funding during the last two weeks of October, when it was far too late to use the money effectively. The Grassley campaign found a unique solution to the problem by taking out a loan for $60,000 in mid-September against its projected last minute receipts. As it turned out, roughly $300,000 to $400,000 was raised in October, more than enough to cover the loan. Other races handled their cash flow shortfalls in different ways, but it was not at all clear that winning campaigns were significantly better at fundraising than were losing campaigns. The McQuaid campaign raised the most money, while the Hansen campaign had serious fundraising deficiencies.

As one conference participant commented after seven hours of interviewing managers, "Now that we know what happened, we would like to re-interview everyone to find out why." Some questions remain for the "political professionals" to answer. What is it, for instance, that is helpful about having a primary? Why did early press attention matter when name recognition can be obtained in other ways? What are the characteristics of a good candidate and a good manager and how can they be identified before hundreds of thousands of dollars are spent on their behalf? Other points also emerged. Many campaigns ended with negative media in 1980. Many also used a substantial positive and negative mixture. According to some professional campaign advisors, such a media program should have failed, yet the heavy attack media played a crucial role in a number of victories. Finally, if peaking is as important as all the consultants say it is, what are the elements that must go into it? Clearly some of the campaigns which lost this year failed in that respect, but the process of defining exactly what peaking means is rather ill-defined. At a time when more and more voters are waiting until the last 30 days to make their decisions, incumbents and challengers need to be particularly careful in planning the last month. Although 1980 presented candidates with some unique challenges that will not be repeated, the new techniques which were applied in many races may have a lasting impact on the art of political campaigning.

CHAPTER IV

Perspectives on the 1980 Election Results

A Speech by V. Lance Tarrance

At the invitation of the Free Congress Foundation, nationally known pollster Lance Tarrance of V. Lance Tarrance Associates in Houston made a presentation to conference attendees on the subject of the 1980 election results and their significance. In the transcript below, Tarrance explores primarily three major topics. Clearly the most controversial of these is the effect of negative advertising by out-of-state independent expenditure groups. Taking survey data from some of the very closely contested U.S. Senate races this year, Tarrance discusses the possible advantages and disadvantages of such independent advertising campaigns. Another major theme of the presentation is the key role of the last 30 days before an election in determining its results. Tarrance shows how last minute shifts in a number of campaigns were the decisive factor. In addition, he also discusses coalition building as an essential element in several campaigns, including the Arkansas gubernatorial contest and the New York U.S. Senate race.

Tarrance's comments are based in part on data released by the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, which took post-election surveys in four states—Iowa, South Dakota, Idaho and New York. Other data are drawn from surveys taken by his firm during the course of the elections.

V. Lance Tarrance is the president and founder of V. Lance Tarrance and Associates, a professional research firm in Houston, Texas, specializing in the analysis of public opinion as it relates to electoral behavior. The company has performed survey research for political candidates running for office at all levels, from presidential to local races. Among his published studies are numerous monographs and four books, including *The Ticket Splitter: A New Force in American Politics,* which he coauthored in 1972. He had served as Vice President of Decision Making Information of California, a respected national research firm, prior to his relocation in Houston in 1977. Tarrance received his master's degree in Political Behavior from American University in 1973 and his B.A. from Washington and Lee University in 1962.

My job today is not to sit back and describe the mechanical history of various individual elections this year. You will be taking a close look at a number of such individual races during the next few days. Rather, I would like to consider what you might call "the big picture" and discuss some important trends in the 1980 congressional races which will have a bearing on the future. Actually I always look forward to these post-election seminars, because in my opinion they help us learn what happened at the real level of politics—the congressional level.

In many ways, we are only just beginning to understand the election results. The Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, for instance, has just taken surveys in thirty-one U.S. House districts. Altogether about 6,000 interviews were conducted. The surveys have produced an enormous amount of data, which I think we will be able to absorb only in increments over a period of time.

In fact, the truth is that we are barely over our tremendous surprise at the election results, and it should be a while before we can be certain about what they mean. First, we have the enormous amount of publicity surrounding the change of national administrations from Carter to Reagan. Second, the fact that Republicans won so much in 1980 has to be considered the total surprise of the decade. Most people thought that a victory of this kind would not be possible until perhaps 1982, although a more likely date was thought to be 1986 or 1988.

Just the other day a friend of mine tried to encourage me to work for a Senate Democrat, Bennett Johnson of Louisiana. I said, "Why should I do that? We are a Republican firm." He said, "Well, he's going to be Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee some day, and we are very, very close to him. We need a lot of help." So I answered, "Have you ever considered the possibility that he might not make it?" "What do you mean?" he said. "He's a cinch in Lousiana." "Well," I said, "Democrats may not always be in charge of the U.S. Senate."

Now one of the first points I would like to discuss is when people make up their minds about a candidate. The trend has been somewhat in evidence for a number of years, but data from the last two elections clearly indicate that more and more people are making their decisions during the last thirty days. In fact, we could almost make this one point a subtitle of my presentation tonight. Data my firm has collected in South Dakota show that almost 40% of the people say they waited until the end to make up their minds. What an enormous impact this time delay factor can have on the larger picture! It has tremendous implications for polling firms as well as for campaigns. If a polling company, or someone who has commissioned a poll, decides not to conduct further surveys after October 15, it is very possible they will not have accurate projections.

Even though roughly 40% of the voters will make up their minds in the last month, the early work done in campaigns is still absolutely necessary. If a campaign is to be competitive in the last 30 days, early and careful preparations are a requirement. The strategy, polling, media plans, and organizational work all have to be in place. Over the last several years, we have taken each of these campaign areas—organization, media theme penetration, and strategic cohesion— and looked at them in an individual, isolated fashion. Because the last 30 days are now so important, it has become crucial that all these factors mesh in a congruent fashion. We have always heard about "peaking" a campaign at the end, but what I mean is something entirely different. Once a campaign reaches the last 30 days, we have to be very sure that all the components are already working very, very well, and not just the week before but the entire month before the election.

Many people, including the Republican committees, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, and others, have spent a great deal of time training people for campaigns two years in advance. You have all heard of candidates who begin their survey work years ahead of time. In fact, we took surveys prior to the November 1980 elections for a gubernatorial candidate and two senators who are up for reelection in 1982.

The importance of early preparation and early survey work has not diminished. It is as useful as ever, but we need to focus more attention on having everything prepared *for the last 30 days*.

I have with me today some of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee's tracking data, available thanks to its executive director, Bob Moore. Basically the data show some of the movements in campaigns during the last month. I wanted to begin with a look at the Arizona Senate race between Republican Senator Barry Goldwater and Democratic challenger Bill Schulz. It was a race which attracted a great deal of interest, simply because in many ways it seemed to go against the trend. What an incredible situation it would have been if Reagan had taken the White House, Republicans had gained control of the Senate, Strom Thurmond had been in charge of the Judiciary Committee, and at the same time Barry Goldwater had been defeated in Arizona. It would have presented a very inconsistent picture to the country, and it certainly would have been a blow to the conservative movement if one of its founding fathers in the early 60's had fallen by the wayside.

Actually we got involved in the campaign fairly late. No one thought Goldwater was having any serious problems until several people outside the campaign noticed that his entire effort was built around billboards, even though he had no need to increase his name familiarity. What he needed was a retention theme. The campaign needed to tell voters why Goldwater should be reelected to the U.S. Senate. The tracking data below show that.

We realized that something needed to be done, and Bob Moore together with others in Washington had time to reformulate some of the campaign's themes. The place on the chart where Goldwater's rating rises and Schulz' declines is the exact moment when the new themes made their impact in the media. Goldwater bought five or six days of television and radio throughout the state, but after this period ended the trend was again down. If that election had been a few days later, we could have been in deep trouble. Once again, you can see that the last



Arizona Statewide/1980

30 days were extremely important. The tracking shows why the incumbent was not doing well. He was not giving the voters a reason for retaining him, while the issues of age and absenteeism were causing him serious problems. Further, the Republican party nationally had been spending millions of dollars to promote a general pro-change sentiment, and that feeling was not helpful to Goldwater.

The next election I would like to look at illustrates a very different situation. As the tracking shows, the Senate race in Oklahoma between Don Nickles (R) and Andy Coats (D) was very close. The graph below


Arizona Statewide/1980

4-day moving average

daily responses/n=100, except 10/21 (n=200)

indicates four-day moving averages, which are statistically valid across time.

For every vote we gained, they gained another one, and that is a rather serious situation. In fact, if there is one thing you really do not want to see in tracking data, it is a structured situation like this, because it means that some very strong conversion techniques will be needed.

After making some very fine-tuned advertising changes, we finally were able to narrow the gap and then take the lead. Once again, you can see that before we stopped tracking on the weekend it was still a close

Oklahoma Statewide/1980

4-day moving average



daily response/n = 100, except 10/18-19 (n = 150)



race. It appeared to be heading toward a 51% or 52% win for Grassley. Bear in mind, however, that we had been nearly frantic just two weeks before, thinking we might have lost it. It would have been truly incredible if John Culver had won against the tide. By his own description, he would have been immediate "presidential timber." And if you thought he was hard to tolerate before the election, imagine his attitude after a victory.



Oklahoma Statewide/1980

Looking at all of these races, you can see that the tracking results show the need for very accurate interpretations of the movements during the last 30 days. The character of each of these races was quite different. Don Nickles certainly was not well-known across Oklahoma and neither was Coats. They were new, "fresh faces." In Iowa, you have a race involving an incumbent who had been in Washington, D.C. for almost 20 years, John Culver, and a challenger who had also been in Washington, Chuck

Grassley. In Arizona, you have a still different situation, with a total newcomer, Bill Schulz, challenging a Republican incumbent of many years. Schulz was putting a great deal of media money into the race, trying to show that Goldwater was no longer doing a good job. Many people still liked Goldwater and thought he was a fine senator. They were conservative and knew he was a conservative. Still, they thought perhaps they needed a change. So, in summary, you have races involving a Democrat incumbent, a Republican incumbent and an open seat with no incumbent.

We stopped tracking in the last two or three days, and it was at that point that the Nickles campaign took the sudden jump which provided him a very comfortable win. Prior to that last effort, the race fluctuated but did not change substantially. It was structured and flat in terms of competitiveness. Because we knew the situation was developing in this way, several people, including consultant Tony Payton, were sent in to try to stabilize the race for Nickles. It was rather like stabilizing an intensive care unit patient. I am not sure whether the Democrats had the same kind of information as we had, but the tracking data made the difference in the last 30 days. We knew where the vote had to come from, and we were sure our coalition was working.

One final race I wanted you to consider also shows, in a slightly different manner, what can happen in the last 30 days. In the Iowa Senate race between incumbent Democrat John Culver and Republican Chuck Grassley, Culver began with a pretty good lead. Grassley lost what I call the "September race," because Culver ran some very smart and hard-hitting advertisements immediately after Labor Day, and Grassley failed to counter them for almost three weeks. Even though he beat Grassley in September, we came back very nicely in October. The final results were really astonishing in fact, with an almost 100,000 vote difference between them. As you can see from the chart below, we were looking at a structured defeat unless we acted quickly.

Altogether, I think the message is not only that we must be prepared for the last 30 days, but also that we must treat this period as a separate campaign. At the outset, during the summer months, there is the 30-40% group who have already made up their minds. Most of them are partisans. Then we have another 20% or so who decide in September. They may have been weak partisans who could not decide sooner, or they may have needed reinforcement. But it is after the September period—and the trend is growing—that most people make up their minds. There are, then, three campaign time frames which have to be confronted, and the most important of these is the *last month*.

You might wonder why people are deciding later and later. I do not believe it is because of confusion. I think people are becoming more and

Iowa Statewide/1980



more independent in voting as they move away from party identification. We are seeing more and more ticket-splitting. We also know that at least 70% of the voters make up their minds because of what they see on television. That figure is not going to decrease; it will increase. In addition, an increasing number of candidates are finding they have to make late adjustments in their campaigns because of outside factors and last minute developments. So I would suggest that those candidates who

Iowa Statewide/1980





can wait until later to do their media work or who can hold off making a decision on personality portrayal may have an advantage because of the importance of those last days.

Another major topic I wanted to discuss today has to do with campaign theme penetration. Two years ago, when we met here for our post-election work, we talked primarily about organization as a key element in a campaign. Jack Fields (R), for instance, who ran against Cong. Bob

Theme Penetration—McGovern Campaign

Among McGovern Voters:	
Seniority	11%
Farm Supporter	6%
Concerned about South Dakota	4%
Experience	3%
Other/Misc.	7%
Among Abdnor Voters:	
Seniority	19%
Farm Supporter	4%
Experience	3%
Concerned about South Dakota	3%
Other/Misc.	15%
Among Unsure/Refused Voters:	
Seniority	7%
Other/Misc.	18%

Eckhardt (D) in Texas talks about the 2-3,000 volunteers who helped in his campaign and about the many pairs of shoes he wore out. Believe me, he was organized. He won a very close race, and, if it had not been for his organization, he probably would not have been elected. We are not going to forget that fact. And yet, organization is just one of several elements that contribute to a successful effort. Clearly campaign theme penetration is another very important factor. Theme penetration refers to the image the voter has of the candidates at the conclusion of the campaign. It is his idea of the candidates as he leaves the voting booth, and it is the bottom line after all the coordinated efforts of a political campaign.

First, I would like to show you some survey data from the South Dakota race between Senator George McGovern (D) and Jim Abdnor (R). It is taken from a post-election survey just completed for the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee. The Committee also did post-election research in three other states to try to find out why Republicans ran as they did. The McGovern-Abdnor campaign is certainly a classic race, and I think it is very important that we understand some of the theme work done there.

In an open-ended question, we asked McGovern voters what campaign themes they remembered from the campaign and why they voted for McGovern. We also asked Abdnor voters the same question about McGovern's campaign.

Basically, McGovern voters saw McGovern in terms of his seniority, which was mentioned by 11%. Another 6% said he supported farmers, and 4% said he was concerned for South Dakota. Those are fairly good themes to get across. Then we asked those who voted for Abdnor what message McGovern was trying to convey about himself. Again, the idea of seniority made the greatest impact. 19% mentioned it. Another 4% mentioned his support of farmers. Experience was mentioned by 3%, and another 3% said he was generally concerned about South Dakota. Normally "experience" is a fairly powerful theme to get across in an election. But the "time for a change" idea which was circulating, and other factors, such as the situations in Afghanistan and Iran, probably caused "experience" to be worth less than usual. The mention of farm support is a normal and important element which every South Dakota politician needs.

Likewise, "concerned for South Dakota" is a good cultural message, and although Democrats have traditionally been more adept at using it, Republicans now handle it fairly well. In fact, this year Republicans used the idea of cultural attachment to the state or district very heavily. One of the best examples of this was seen in the Alphonse D'Amato (R-C) campaign in New York against Sen. Jacob Javits (L) and Elizabeth Holtzman (D). One of the better ads for D'Amato showed his mother saying why she thought "you ought to vote for my son." It was almost a tear-jerking advertisement, but it was very effective. In fact, I have never seen any other campaign use the candidate's mother quite as heavily as this one. Also, they used a still photography technique in their media. They had almost lithographic-looking pictures, showing where D'Amato was born, the street he used to play in, and so forth. In about a minute and a half, you felt as if you had grown up with D'Amato in the city. It is very important that voters believe a candidate is culturally attached to an area. If they do not know him personally, they will not vote for him unless they feel that territorial attachment.

Looking again at the Abdnor-McGovern survey, you can see that Abdnor's supporters perceived McGovern in very nearly the same way as McGovern voters. There was no large difference in terms of the message McGovern was communicating. But when we look at the message which Abdnor was communicating you will see that he conveyed quite a bit more than McGovern. Again we asked those who voted for Abdnor what they recalled as his campaign message. Here the list is slightly longer because the percentages were higher.

First of all, 6% mentioned "working for South Dakota" as a theme. Abdnor apparently covered what I call the "activity dimension"—indicating he is perceived as active and young enough to handle the job in the Senate. He also covered himself on the subject of helping farmers,

Theme Penetration—Abdnor Campaign

Among Abdnor Voters:	
Work for South Dakota/People	6%
Farm Supporter	8%
Listens to People	4%
Time for a Change	4%
Concerned about Older Citizens	3%
National Defense	3%
Other/Misc.	18%
Among McGovern Voters:	
Concerned for South Dakota	4%
Farm Supporter	3%
New Face	2%
National Defense	2%
Better Job	2%
Negative Campaign	2%
Other/Misc.	14%
Among Unsure/Refused Voters:	
Concerned for People/State	3%
Past Record	2%
Other/Misc.	20%

which was mentioned by 8%. Having the farm dimension really is a *sine qua non* in South Dakota. Another 4% mentioned "listens to people." Lumped in with that category are those who said he is "one of us," the general idea being that Abdnor was not seen as part of the Washington, D.C. environment. Still another 4% said "time for a change," which is again not an idea that people have when they wake up in the morning. It is a feeling which may develop over a period of several elections.

In addition, the fact that 3% mentioned "older citizen concern" also points to good work. In previous years, Democrats have always accused Republicans of being insensitive to the working man. Now Democrats are trying to add the impression that Republicans are insensitive to older people, a trend we have noticed in Idaho, Iowa and elsewhere. Traditionally the older citizen vote has gone to Republicans, but Democrats are now trying to make gains among these voters. In any case, Abdnor apparently did a good job of portraying himself as sensitive to people in general and to older citizens in particular. He captured the national trend of "time for a change," and he has a populist dimension. He also covered the cultural dimension by communicating his interest in farming. Beyond that, he also had a physical activity dimension working for him. So I think you can see that Abdnor's "mix," as we call it, was better than McGovern's.

Even among McGovern voters who were asked "what was Jim Abdnor's campaign message," 4% said that he was "concerned about the state." Another 3% remembered that he had something to say about farmers. The need for new faces in Washington was mentioned by 2%, and 2% mentioned national defense. As far as I can tell, the mention of national defense means that they were acknowledging McGovern's weakness on that particular issue. The fact that 2% said Abdnor could do a better job indicates to me that they may have been wondering whether McGovern really could handle the job.

Once again, these questions remind us how important the bottom-line, residual effect of advertising is in a campaign. If a candidate does not have theme penetration by the time he reaches the last 30 days, he will not be able to win. So often candidates have great advertising, good organization, and good money, but they are still defeated because their themes were not synchronized properly.

So far, I have talked about theme penetration and the importance of the last 30 days. Now I would like to add another key element in campaigns this year—coalition building. Coalition building used to be something political scientists discussed in textbooks, but which was rarely put into practice. A coalition approach was perhaps used to reach suburban and rural voters, or black and white voters, and so forth. In the past, Republicans paid little attention to coalitions, they tended to stay with their own native, WASP base. Now, however, candidates are using coalition building in a very much more complicated fashion. In this election, for instance, candidates such as Al D'Amato were appealing to ethnic Catholics. In states such as Texas, the GOP has found it can attract as much as 30% of the Mexican-American vote, which was always assumed to be solidly Democratic. Coalition building has now become one of the first things we teach a candidate. He cannot reach 51% for a minimum winning coalition unless he attracts far more than just the base Republican vote.

Perhaps one of the best examples of the importance of coalition building this year was the race in Arkansas between incumbent Democratic Governor Bill Clinton and Republican challenger Frank White, with whom we were working. Arkansas, as you know, is not a very pleasant place for Republicans. Even the country clubs in Little Rock are oriented towards the state government, and they tend to attract liberal Democrats. To find any Republicans, you have to go into the hills of the 3rd congressional district, held by Cong. John Paul Hammerschmidt (R). Besides winning the Hammerschmidt seat, Republicans made a breakthrough in 1978 when they elected Cong. Ed Bethune in Little Rock. They succeeded partly because of divisions within the Democratic party. Outside of those two cases, Republicans had never elected a governor, except for Winthrop Rockefeller. Rockefeller did defeat the old Orval Faubus machine, but it was a very costly election. Frank White did not buy the election this year, and he did not have the anti-Faubus historical image in the political background. He won, in my opinion, with hard organization, good campaign media, and some interesting coalition work among several kinds of Democrats.

This election had some peculiarities because certain Democrats did not like Bill Clinton for cultural reasons. He was a Yale graduate and an Oxford scholar. His wife had not taken his name because she is a feminist. Also, Clinton had quite a few very liberal Democrats helping him run the state government. So he was never perceived as a good old Razorback.

For purposes of coalition building, we divided the voters into several categories.

Usual Vote vs. Ballot Strength (September, 1980)

	White	Undecided	Weak Clinton	Strong Clinton
All Republicans	64%	5%	18%	13%
Ticket-Splitters	52%	6%	30%	12%
Switch Democrats	43%	6%	32%	19%
Soft Democrats	17%	15%	23%	44%
Yellow Dog Democrats	21%	5%	38%	36%
All Blacks	5%	*	53%	42%

* = less than 1%

First, we separated those who said they consistently voted Republican. Next, we looked at the ticket-splitters, those who said they owed no allegiance to either party even to the slightest extent. Then we distinguished three categories of Democrats: switch Democrats, soft Democrats, and yellow-dog Democrats. Switch Democrats were those who said they voted for a few more Democrats than Republicans. They were not behavorial, straight-ticket Democrats, nor were they ticket-splitters. They had clearly voted for some Republicans, although they thought of themselves as Democrats. The soft Democrats were those who admitted they had voted for a Republican at the state or local level once or twice in their lives. They were rather strongly Democratic, but they would admit to deviating at least once. Last were the yellow-dog Democrats who said they never would vote for a Republican under any circumstances.

The reason I am explaining these categories is that we mechanically and statistically profiled these groups, and compared them to the pro-Clinton vote. Then we further broke down the strongly pro-Clinton vote by trying out three or four of our attack themes on those who might vote against him. At the same time, we were dividing up the state among various types of Democrats and then monitoring our progress among them through the election. We even adjusted our surveys for turnout—high, medium or low—since not everyone who is surveyed actually votes.

By late September, it had become a 57-43 race. Remember that the normal Republican vote in Arkansas is about 16%, but a candidate can increase that to the high 30's if he does fairly well. With 43% we thought we had a fairly promising situation, even in September. By late October, the figures were 53%-47%, with Clinton still ahead. We arrived at those figures by adjusting for low, medium or high turnout. If we had not done that adjustment, we would have believed we were going to be beaten by 16-20 points, as other surveys taken in Arkansas showed. We had been watching the changing components of our coalition as we proceeded with our media efforts. Then, after we adjusted for turnout, we realized we had a very close race, although we were not sure exactly how close. We had no tracking data, and our last survey was taken 15 days before the election. To be perfectly honest, I never thought we were going to win, because Arkansas is not a good state for Republicans, particularly in gubernatorial elections. Only when I heard about it on election night did I believe it.

As you consider the importance of theme penetration and the last 30 days, remember that coalition building is equally essential. Finding the Democrat who might switch one more time before he dies can mean the difference. In the 1978 Texas gubernatorial race (between Republican Bill Clements and Democrat John Hill), Clements found he was losing conservative Democratic support in the rural areas. He reallocated his media and tried to reverse the situation. Clements won the election, but without that kind of information, he would not have known exactly which part of his coalition he was losing. It is important to bear in mind, if you are working for a candidate, that he may not be the only person with survey research. John Hill also apparently learned that he was losing support from conservative Democrats, who saw him as a liberal on fiscal matters. As a result, he tried to create a conservative image. His efforts hurt Clements, who had to counter them in order to win. Although Clements did not win by a great deal, he knew the component within the formula and why it was changing, and so was able to react in time.

The last general area I would like to discuss is independent expenditures and negative advertising. When I speak of an independent expen-

October Tracking



*Cumulative Results: Clinton 47, White 38.

diture group, I do not mean such long-standing organizations as the Republican National Committee or the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee. Rather I have in mind the Moral Majority, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), and other oil and special interest PACs. You may remember, for instance, the "Anybody But Carter" committees. The sponsoring groups were not interested in building their own name recognition, nor did they want to demonstrate that Reagan was a great candidate. They simply wanted to demonstrate that Carter was a bad President.

Most groups such as these want to convince the voter not to support somebody. Clearly the organization which aroused the most attention



Ballot Support in the 1980 Governor's Election in Arkansas
(All Registered Voters)

this year was NCPAC. I am sure there is a great deal of discussion taking place in Washington, and maybe even in Moscow, about NCPAC's effect on the 1980 elections. Whom did they hurt? Did they help anybody? We have already heard people such as Terry Dolan, Director of NCPAC, state that he will stop an independent campaign if it damages the wrong candidate.

In any case, the key point to keep in mind is that independent expenditures are here to stay. The Supreme Court has held in several cases that if a committee is completely independent of any campaign, it is operating within perfectly legal bounds. At this point, the existence of independent expenditure groups is legally so strong that I doubt you will see any further challenges, similar to those attempted by President Carter and Common Cause during this election.

As you may know, the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee sponsored four post-election surveys in the states which were very highly contested this year. Among them was South Dakota, and I would like to show you some of the survey data from that state which have to do with independent expenditures.

South Dakota

Amount of Negative Advertising	
Everything	2%
A Great Deal	35%
Somewhat More	36%
About the Same as Normal	22%
Less than Usual	4%
Unsure	1%
Focus of the Negative Media	
Anti-McGovern	36%
Mixed	43%
Anti-Abdnor	21%

One question we asked respondents was how much negative advertising they noticed in the state this year. Now you and I know that South Dakota was really a "national hot spot" in 1980. South Dakota voters, however, did not necessarily see it that way. Only 37% said they felt there was a great deal or an enormous amount of negative advertising. Another 36% said "somewhat more," which is a middle ground response. In my opinion, with all that went into South Dakota, a "somewhat more" response is just not very strong. The next group, 22% said "about the same" as usual. They must be accustomed to much more political warfare than we are. Only 4% said "less than usual."

Next, we asked them against whom the negative advertising was directed. Again, you and I would have said it was against McGovern. But only 36% of the South Dakota voters would have agreed with us. Another 21% felt that Abdnor took some unfair hits, while the great bulk in the middle, 43% said both candidates were affected. Once again, the answers to these two questions show that there was not as much negative connotation to this election as we might have thought. Almost 40% thought it was a fairly negative campaign, but the distribution is uneven. So our respondents simply did not perceive the whole campaign as purely anti-McGovern.

Next we asked, "What was the source of the anti-McGovern media?"

Source of the Anti-McGovern Media

Abdnor Campaign	26%
In-State Groups	28%
Out-of-State Groups	30%
Don't Know/Unsure	16%

This question was limited to those who, in the previous question, had said the negative media was focused on McGovern. Bear in mind that by so limiting the question, we were including some staunch McGovern loyalists. Yet even with that kind of inherent bias in the questionnaire, only 26% said the source was the Abdnor campaign. Another 28% said "in-state groups," and 30% said "out-of-state groups." A total of 16% were unsure. Those who said "out-of-state groups" probably meant NCPAC, and those who mentioned "in-state groups" may have been referring to Moral Majority or some of the right to life organizations which operate primarily within a state, rather than on an interstate basis. The main point is that while the anti-McGovern media might have adversely affected Abdnor, apparently it did not. The voters realized that there was some negative advertising but they did not see it as predominant, and they did not believe it was solely focused on McGovern. In fact, some other data I have show that when the McGovern campaign began attacking Abdnor, the effort backfired, hurting the Senator more than it did Abdnor.

The next question we asked related to the way voters generally perceived some of the independent expenditure groups.

General Impressions

Moral Majority/Right to Life	1:1
NCPAC	-8:1
Oil/Energy Contributions	-3:1

Specific Open-End Responses

	(+,0)	(−)	(D.K.)
Moral Majority/Right to Life	37%	36%	27%
NCPAC	14%	63%	23%
Oil-Energy	22%	46%	32%

For Moral Majority and National Right to Life, we found a roughly one to one positive to negative. About 30% commented unfavorably about Moral Majority. Another 25% said they knew about Moral Majority and had a positive orientation toward it. An additional 20% said they knew of Moral Majority, but could not give a comment. The mere fact that this 20% could not comment probably means they can be shifted towards the positive side. They might have said something negative but did not. So, I would say the Moral Majority had about a one to one ratio. NCPAC, on the other hand, had about an eight to one negative image. NCPAC was viewed very, very negatively in the state of South Dakota, and the same was true in Iowa and Idaho in 1980.

Terry Dolan maintains that how NCPAC is perceived is unimportant. He says they are not trying to win a national image contest, but are seeking to focus attention on the incumbent. To that extent, he is right.

We also asked respondents about oil and energy political action committees. They had a three to one negative ratio. On the other hand, a lot of people really were not aware of their involvement in that election.

We then asked the open-ended question, "Tell us what you like or dislike about these groups." These responses have been summarized and regrouped somewhat. Moral Majority again had about as many positives as negatives, with 27% who had no opinion. Another 36% said something like "the church should not be in politics." Thirty-seven percent said something very positive or neutral, and most answers were positive.

When we asked about NCPAC, the comments became much sharper. A total of 48% said specifically that they did not like NCPAC. The comments on the oil companies were also about two to one negative.

One other important point should be mentioned. With all the negative campaigning, only 28% of those surveyed said they voted *against* McGovern, whereas over 60% said they voted *for* Abdnor. In other words, despite all the criticisms of McGovern coming from so many directions, Abdnor had a very positive image. In the final analysis, people voted for Abdnor rather than against McGovern by a two or three to one positive ratio. On the other hand, NCPAC certainly did not come out of this election with any kind of "Miss America" potential.

I bring up the subject of independent expenditures because, in my opinion, as long as there is an Eddie Chiles who is "mad," you are going to have such expenditure groups somewhere in America. In all likelihood, conservatives will not be alone in using such techniques. McGovern has already launched his independent expenditure group, and liberals generally are going to begin competing very seriously in this field.

Certainly a positive result of these efforts is that they clarify the ideological perceptions of the candidate. In the 1976 election, we know that Jimmy Carter had as many people thinking he was a liberal as thought he was a conservative. Many congressmen exist in life by creating a mish-mash, salt and pepper image. They can be liberal one day and conservative the next.

If we take a look at some of the Iowa survey results, we see that something certainly helped to clarify Culver's image.

Iowa and Culver's Image

Voters who Think Culver is a:	**Perception Mid 1979 July**	**Positioning Early 1980 June**	**Difference**
Conservative	34%	20%	−14
Moderate/Liberal	46%	70%	+24
Don't Know	20%	10%	−10

In mid-1979, only 46% thought Culver was moderate or liberal in his views. At the same time, 34% in the state of Iowa thought Culver was a conservative. Another 20% had no opinion. So, a majority of almost 55% either did not know what he was or thought he was a conservative. Now it is very hard to win a campaign if you are portraying someone as a liberal while the voters are filtering out your message. By June of 1980, however, Culver's image had shifted tremendously toward the liberal end of the spectrum. In addition, the number of people with no opinion had decreased. One conclusion we could reach from these figures is that although Grassley was involved in a controversial Senate primary, outside expenditures might well have caused the shift. Grassley was not attacking Culver's liberalism every day of the week, and Culver himself was trying to improve his image.

It is also possible that Culver caused some of this change, because he kept declaring, "Yes, I'm a liberal. I'm proud of it, and I dare you to come and get me." Still, we can conclude from the data that NCPAC and other independent groups conveyed their message to the voters slowly but surely, and that before the actual campaign reached its high point, the race had already achieved ideological clarity. Altogether that is a fairly important point to consider. If these outside groups can supply ideological clarity in such contests, perhaps they have done something worthwhile.

Aside from ideological considerations, we also took a look at when people became aware of the various outside groups.

Awareness—South Dakota

When did you first become aware of . . .

	Moral Majority	NCPAC	Oil-Energy
Last Year	40%	17%	17%
Earlier This Year	14%	15%	14%
Last Summer	19%	18%	20%
Last 2 Months	23%	47%	39%

We asked South Dakota voters when they first noticed the work of independent organizations in the state. Forty percent said they had heard of the Moral Majority last year. Another 14% said "earlier this year," and 19% said "last summer." A total of 23% said they heard of it during the "last two months." Apparently the Moral Majority did its job earlier and more quietly than NCPAC, which was widely recognized only at the end of the campaign. A total of 47% said they became aware of NCPAC during the "last two months" of the campaign. This percentage may indicate that it became an issue in the campaign. In my opinion, the purpose of an outside, independent expenditure should be to correct ideological misperceptions. That is not a bad goal, just so long as the organization itself does not become an issue. On the other hand, NCPAC would probably respond that if it "takes the heat off" in the last two months, the value of its previous work may be lost.

That is a very difficult question, and I imagine one that will be seriously debated in the next few years. Again, if we think of the importance of the last 30 days, the question is whether independent expenditure groups should withdraw after they have tilled and seeded the land, or whether they should continue their efforts and actually bring in the crop. It appears that the Moral Majority made a quiet and early input into the election, and it may even have helped clarify the ideologies of the two candidates more than NCPAC did. We cannot be certain, however, since we can only draw indirect conclusions.

So far, I have tried to describe some of the positive and negative potentials of outside expenditures and negative advertising. I want to add one more possible good point. It has been almost a standard technique among Democrats for the last 20 to 30 years to launch very last minute, emotional appeals. The labor unions in particular have used their phone banks to attack Republicans as "rich people" who do not care about others. "He's not in your class," they would say. "He's up there in the so-called country clubs and is not one of us." This has been a very successful tactic for 20 years. Also, it had certain roots in the FDR coalition.

Now, however, we discover that many things have changed. An ethnic Catholic who is earning $30,000 a year as a carpenter may not be attuned to this standard theme anymore. The middle class is becoming more and more frustrated. They see Democrats as being either very upper class or very lower class, and they think the giant middle ground is being ignored. Democrats have now changed their tactics somewhat to make their appeal against the oil companies, cartels, and international oligopolies. They are appealing to energy frustration. In fact, you may recall President Carter's rhetoric when the Windfall Profits Tax passed. It was really amazing to see a President, who should be a unifying force in America, make some of the accusations he did. I believe the Democrats were prepared to launch an emotional, class-oriented attack on the oil companies very heavily in the last 30 days. Furthermore, I believe they were convinced that those last days were theirs, despite President Carter's difficulties and the "time for a change" theme Republicans were using. I would bet you a dime to a dollar most Democrats were counting on that theme to win the election for them in the end. Their strategy was preempted, however.

It is my hypothesis that the groundwork done by NCPAC, Moral Majority, and other groups negated the effects of the last minute, emotional appeals by Democrats. It was as if a coach, in the last quarter of a game, decided to try three trick plays, which the team had practiced many times. The team then went out, and tried to execute the plays, only to find out that the defense had six men ready and able to block the play. So, it is possible that NCPAC, with its hard-charging negative advertising, helped to balance the scale when the Democrats made their oil company accusations.

Remember that politics is based on two opposite perceptions. If two candidates are seen as holding the same views, and voters do not believe there are any real differences between them, they tend not to make a change. On the other hand, if they perceive big differences between candidates, they will change their votes, often many times. When the candidates are seen as similar, voting decisions tend to be made based on party, family, peer group, and so forth. If the differences are strong, the voter may abandon his normal party orientation to cast his vote for other reasons. In the past, Republicans have often gone into the last 30 days with a fairly good lead, and still lost. How many elections in the last ten to fifteen years can you recall in which the final results were 52-48 or less? Many of these victories were union engineered. They knew how to get the last two or three points in an election by using some of the old social class conflict themes.

A second possible good effect of outside expenditures is their focusing attention on the incumbent. Basically they discuss and raise questions about the incumbent's entire record during the year before the election. They may prevent him from becoming or remaining an ideological mishmash. They may also prevent him from saying things which should not go unchallenged. By placing such a hard spotlight on the incumbent, these groups indirectly allow the challenger to develop his positive image. While the incumbent is busy answering charges, the challenger grows in a positive light. Jim Abdnor, for instance, is a good case in point. About 60% said they voted for Abdnor rather than against McGovern. So, if an outside expenditure is done properly and does not become an issue unto itself, it can divert attention to the incumbent and allow the challenger to strengthen his position.

Another factor here is what I call the "antecedent theory." Basically it would seem that outside expenditures change the antecedents to an election so that liberal Democrats who attempt a moderate image do not have the maneuvering room they might normally have. If outside groups change the perception of these incumbents early, their ability to obscure ideological questions is much more limited.

One further possible impact of these kinds of expenditures is that they may polarize the voters at the outset of the campaign. We call this idea the "lightning rod theory." In the case of the South Dakota race, the outside expenditures may have reinforced anti-McGovern voters. As a result, they may, for instance, have contributed three times to Abdnor instead of only once. At the same time, the lightning rod also could have motivated the pro-McGovern voters, so that there were fewer defections and less cross-over voting.

The fact is that we do not know a great deal about outside expenditures and their impact at this point. We do not know what the rules of the game should be for outside expenditures. Many candidates are concerned about, and some feel threatened by, the activities of out-of-state groups over which they have no control. Clearly these groups are going to be an interesting phenomenon in future elections. If they do their work early and avoid becoming "third candidates," if they help clarify ideological deception and divert attention to enable the challenger to develop a positive image, then they would have a beneficial effect. On the other hand, if they carry their campaigns too far into the election, it is possible they could do some real harm. What they need to do is prove that the contest is a two-man race. In so doing, they release the challenger from the necessity of allocating resources to draw those same distinctions.

We can find a few indications that these groups ought to do their job a little better and in a little more refined fashion. But we cannot simply reject out-of-state expenditures as a bad thing. At this point, we are dealing with pioneer efforts on a frontier. Some groups will be helpful and others will be harmful, but we may not know for a decade what is ideal.

To summarize, I want to emphasize again the importance of the last 30 days. At least 40% of the electorate—and that figure may be growing—will be making up their minds late. A candidate needs to have solid theme penetration by the time he reaches that point in his campaign. If Abdnor had not had a number of themes, touching on sensitivity, activity, populism, and cultural attachment, he might not have survived the last-minute appeals by the Democrats. In short, he adjusted to the changing climate at the end.

Second, in most successful campaigns, such as that of Frank White in Arkansas, it is necessary to have a coalition strategy well prepared. We ran the White campaign almost like an intensive care unit. Nearly every day we checked for the composition of that coalition to be sure key elements, such as ticket-splitters, switch and soft Democrats, remained in our camp and that their support stayed at a certain level. Generally speaking, if a candidate is supported by a majority of the ticket-splitters in September, he probably has a winning campaign. If, on the other hand, he is not winning the ticket-splitters in the late summer, he is not on schedule. If he has support from 30% of the conservative Democrats, he has something going. But if the percentage declines in the last two to three weeks of the campaign, he may be in serious trouble—the Democrat may have found his "soft spot," and he could end the campaign with the support of Republicans and a few ticket-splitters, adding up to only 48%. There is no substitute, in my opinion, for developing a campaign formula for the voter types or target groups which need to be monitored during the last 30 days.

The third point is that a candidate ought to plan in advance to deal with the effects of outside expenditures on his race. He should develop his own scenario as to how they will help or hurt him. Many candidates this year spent a great deal of time talking about "how to deal with NCPAC in my state" or "how to deal with Moral Majority." Frankly, I do not believe some of their decisions were very coherent. In any case, whatever negative feelings NCPAC may have aroused in South Dakota, those feelings had minimal impact on Jim Abdnor. In summary, it does not appear that out-of-state expenditures can deal anyone a fatal blow at this point. It appears that they can be helpful, if they do not become a separate issue at the end of the campaign. If they do, they can potentially hurt a candidate, but even that point is still not absolutely proven by the data.

At this time, I would like to stop and ask for questions.

Question: NCPAC maintains that it ended all advertising in South Dakota in June. Yet your survey data show that a large majority of the people found out about NCPAC during the last few months of the election. Is that because McGovern made NCPAC the issue?

Answer: It appears so, yes. Terry Dolan claims that when NCPAC stops advertising in a state, the conservative candidate quite often has difficulty surviving on his own. Apparently he saw some indications in South Dakota that after NCPAC stopped its ads, Abdnor was not doing very well. When they resumed their campaign, they resuscitated his candidacy. I really do not know whether that is the correct conclusion or not. There is not enough strong evidence either way, and Terry Dolan can probably say whatever he pleases at this point. He is right, however, about one point. A PAC can be ill perceived, with an eight to one negative ratio, and still not have those negatives affect a candidate such as Abdnor.

On the other hand, voters really were not aware of NCPAC early in the campaign. Perhaps NCPAC's early advertising did not have as much impact as you might think. Then again, something happened to John Culver in Iowa because by 1980 large numbers of people suddenly realized that he was liberal, not moderate or conservative, as they had believed in 1979. Something put Culver into the ideological place where we wanted him in Iowa. I cannot really find evidence to prove that Chuck Grassley's early campaigning was the sole cause of that movement.

Question: I have watched some of the NCPAC commercials, and the name "NCPAC" appears only at the end. The average person would almost have to be watching for it to notice it. Is it possible that people got the message NCPAC was trying to convey, but they did not really notice who was the sponsor?

Answer: You may be right, although in Idaho and in Iowa, where we have tested that point, NCPAC was not an unknown quantity even a year ago. We did a survey in Idaho during early spring of 1980, and already NCPAC was well-known and totally disliked. So I cannot say they were first noticed in the last two months. In fact, it is possible that those recognition figures are partly due to national media. I am told that Arthur Finkelstein has done a good deal of NCPAC post-election survey work, and he cannot distinguish the state campaign from the national publicity. It has perhaps become a national, rather than a state by state phenomenon.

Question: Your figures showed that the positive and negative ratings of Moral Majority were roughly equal. Do you have crosstabs which would indicate that the negatives came primarily from McGovern voters? Did the positives come primarily from Abdnor voters?

Answer: I do not have the crosstabs in front of me, but certainly the strongest negatives throughout the survey came from McGovern voters. On the subject of Moral Majority, you might like to hear some of the negative comments made in open-ended questions. Primarily voters criticized their political involvement. "They should stay out of politics;" "that is an individual decision, not a church decision;" "I don't think they should be involved." On the other hand, the comments about NCPAC were very much stronger. "They are out to kill McGovern;" "they are picking on people;" "they are a group of outsiders insensitive to South Dakota;" "it's political slander;" "they don't always tell the truth;" "they are one-sided;" "they are radical;" "too powerful." Those are the opinions of a rather different intensity.

Question: Would you comment on how the old liberal coalition is changing? In our area, liberal Democrats had built their coalition over the years with organized labor, minorities, teachers, government workers, etc. They did a lot of target mail to their coalition, and it pulled them through. Did this election indicate any changes? Have we made any inroads into their coalition?

Answer: There is no doubt that the labor unions did not behave in this past election as they normally do. I have never seen them as quiet as they were during this presidential election. They really kept a low profile this time, partly because of Carter's problems, but also because of Reagan's own former union ties. Further, as one Democrat told me, most voters really do believe that the Democrats in Congress are responsible for our country's problems. The idea of blaming Democratic control in Washington has finally penetrated to the average voter. Likewise, the issue of government spending has been around for a long time, but only now has it become *the* issue, and it has helped Republicans. At the same time, it also undermines the union approach to blue collar workers. Economic mobility has further contributed to the problem.

Another part of the Democratic coalition nationally has been what I call the uninformed, God-fearing, rural southern Democrat, who is personally conservative but has voted Democratic because he and his father have always been Democrats. But now we have "electronic ministries," churches, and networks of preachers interpreting elections, talking about good and bad candidates, evil and honesty, and so forth. Many of these voters have suddenly got the message from a person in their community that so and so, whether he be a candidate for president, senator, or whatever, is personally "our kind of candidate," while so and so is not. These voters understand that approach. They do not understand Kemp-Roth and similar issues. Moreover, these people are coming to the polls, and they are changing historical voting patterns. Not only is economic politics hurting the Democrats, changes in these patterns are also hurting them. They may end up with center-city racial minorities and what I call "Route 128 elites" in Boston, and that is not a very durable coalition for the future.

In fact, while we are on this subject, I should say that I will be very surprised if Republicans cannot control the national government for 16 of the next 20 years. The attitudinal forces for such a shift are there. Consider the population migration to the sunbelt, suburban areas, small counties and middle populated areas. Consider the fact that these areas have become very conservative. When you look at the potential 1982 election results after redistricting we might see the convergence of a very strong political and population force at a unique moment in history.

Question: On the subject of redistricting, in Texas we may find ourselves only four months away from the primary before the district lines are finally drawn. Is that going to cause polling problems when citizens do not know in which district they live?

Answer: I am glad you mentioned that point. I was recently in Claremont, California, and the U.S. Census Bureau director told me that because of legal challenges they may not be able to proceed with redistricting until September or November of 1981. At this point two forces are pressuring the Census Bureau—those who believe there was an undercount of minorities and those who are worried about an overcount of illegal aliens. At the moment, those who are concerned about an undercount have an injunction preventing any numbers from being transmitted to the President. As long as the numbers cannot be transmitted to the President, he cannot submit them to the House and Senate clerks, and in turn the Governors cannot be notified to begin the redistricting process. The director said that if they must comply with what the undercount people want, the numbers will not be available until the fall. In Texas, such a delay would mean no spring legislative redistricting in 1981, and someone may have to file suit to extend the filing deadlines.

But basically the Democrats are most fearful of the tremendous population shift to the sunbelt, which could mean that 14 to 20 seats will go from the frostbelt to the sunbelt states. If recognition of the shift is delayed because of Census Bureau problems, the 1982 elections may have to be conducted as were the 1980 elections.

If the population shift and the new coalitions which seem to be developing around Reagan continue to expand, you will see a very strong political force gaining momentum. But if legal challenges can hold up the entire Census Bureau and delay recognition of the population shift, it will become apparent again how important federal judges are in our political system.

Question: George Will has argued in some of his columns that all the Senate victories were really the result of the Reagan landslide. I believe that each of the newly elected senators put together his own coalition which was in many ways separate from the one which elected Reagan in the state. Which of us is more accurate?

Answer: I believe that you are correct. Each of the senate races was an individual campaign, and many senators ran far ahead of Reagan in their states. Clearly Reagan did not elect a senator who received more votes than he did. Furthermore, the Reagan staff did not work as closely with congressional campaigns as Presidential candidates have in the past, when they shared the same trains and television studios. My instincts tell me that in a few cases Reagan probably helped. He may have helped in Arizona. Who knows? In most cases, Reagan did not have such a 99% overlap with the Republican candidate that it would be possible to say he swept him into office. I also think that this year there was a receptivity to the idea of change, and that idea helped Reagan. I believe Reagan's personality carried the day. In fact if the debates had not been held, he might not have been elected.

Interpretations of what happened nationally range across an entire spectrum. Bob Teeter has called it a "Republican" sweep. Others say it was a "conservative" sweep. Pat Cadell has said it was just an "anti-incumbent" sweep. Nobody really knows how to sweep it. Some Democrats have maintained that many party members lost because they were on borrowed time anyway, having been elected as disguised liberals from conservative states such as Indiana and Idaho. Other Democrats also argue that "realignment" is occurring only in the south, and that therefore national Democrats can make a strong comeback in 1982 and 1984. These ideas reflect a "mitigate the disaster" attitude, and I doubt their validity.

In my opinion, a number of "sweeps" occurred in this election, but none of them by itself classifies the election. We did witness some pro-change sentiment. If there was any sweep, it sprang from a feeling of frustration and a desire to elect new people to office. I agree with that theory very strongly. But the idea that it was a conservative sweep in all cases is without foundation. There were exceptions. There was possibly an anti-incumbent feeling, but I am not sure the idea of a Republican sweep can be justified, although certainly the stigma attached to Republicans because of Watergate has faded. Altogether, I am not sure it was a meaningful mandate. From a meteorological standpoint, I do not believe it was a very strong front, just the advancing wind of a *potential* front.

I do believe, however, that over the last 25 years, we have seen an almost glacially slow conservative push. It has been frustrated by assassinated presidents, by anti-Viet Nam youth cultures, by Watergate, and so forth. But now it appears to be about ready to begin moving again. I do not believe we can say this was a "detonator" election. Perhaps it was a precursor election.

The nomadic Indians, as you may recall from your readings, followed the custom that an elderly Indian who could not keep up with the pace of tribal life was not allowed to move with the tribe. He had to stay so many hundred yards behind, and he could not eat and sleep in the same tents. These older Indians got weaker, of course, and finally went off into the woods to die. Well, in a way, Frank Church underwent a similar experience, and the same phenomenon almost trapped Goldwater. These were people who just could not keep up any longer because they were out of sync with the electorate. In the case of John Culver we proved that if you say, "I'm liberal and proud of it; come and get me," you are not going to do very well. Liberals are going to have to revise that strategy in 1982 because confrontation politics by retaliating liberals did not work in 1980.

Question: You mentioned that Democrats believe the voters now blame Democratic control of Congress for inflation. Do you have any data to support that idea, and do you think that perception will survive into 1982, since Republicans now control Congress?

Answer: Probably the best thing going for Republicans is to have the House still under Democratic control for another few years. But if Republicans do finally win a majority in the House, I would expect the voters to allow a honeymoon period, which could last three, four or five elections as they give Republicans a chance to make some real changes.

There are data available, however, bearing on your first question. I have seen the Republican National Committee's survey, conducted by Bob Teeter, and there is no doubt about it.

We are dealing with something that takes almost a generation to develop. Just because Republicans now control the presidency and the Senate does not mean the public will suddenly place the blame on them for these problems. Republicans have been out of power for a long time. And yet people have only recently realized that their being out of power might be the root cause of the country's problems. It has taken almost 30 years for people to see the Democratic monopoly of power in this light. So I would expect it to take at least 15 years or more for Republicans to have the same kind of problem. It is a generational perception.

On another subject altogether, I wanted to make another point. At a Peter Hart election seminar a few weeks ago, Hart said that the single thing which hurt Democrats the most was the fact that "Republicans had learned to control the debate." Obviously there were other factors too, but he believed that defining the issues was what really mattered, and independent expenditure groups were responsible for much of the issue work this year. If you doubt that independent expenditures will continue in 1982, I think you are wrong. If you remember how sheepherders used to fight for territory in the west, you will recall that only a few sheepherders had to be killed by professional gunslingers before the sheepherders hired their own gunslingers. Now we have McGovern developing his own independent groups, and you will see others doing the same.

Another point is that, from the point of view of a political scientist, party identification is now at its lowest ebb in 100 years. Candidate personality and television are at their highest level of influence. Single issues are fashionable and becoming more so, and they can affect elections if the groups promoting them do not become "third candidates." The data I have seen suggest that independent groups will have even more impact if they can remain in-state. In my opinion, the days of the out-of-state, independent expenditure groups may be numbered. NCPAC may not always be lobbing grenades from Arlington, Virginia into any state in the Union.

In the future, I think most independent expenditures may be made within a state, and by the end of the 1980's independent groups may well be the strongest new force in American politics. In the 1980's, the debate may be controlled by independent, non-party expenditure groups, outside our traditional party structure. Already the perceptions of the parties have been refocused, largely through the ticket-splitting of the 1960's and 1970's. Negative advertising by these independent non-parties may well be very acceptable by the end of this decade.

Appendices

Election Returns*

California's 5th District

Primary: June 3

John Burton	Unopposed	
DENNIS McQUAID	Unopposed	

General:

John Burton	101,105	51.1%
DENNIS McQUAID	89,624	45.3%
Dan Dougherty (LI)	7,092	3.6%

Indiana's 3rd District

Primary: May 6

John Brademas	35,218	72.4%
Mary Hipsak	5,919	12.2%
Richard V. Meller	7,490	15.4%

JOHN HILER	23,548	57.9%
RICHARD PFEIL	15,567	38.2%
THOMAS ZORNOW	1,582	3.9%

General:

John Brademas	85,136	45.0%
JOHN HILER	103,972	55.0%

Iowa U.S. Senate

Primary: June 3

John Culver	Unopposed	

CHARLES GRASSLEY	170,120	65.5%
TOM STONER	89,409	34.5%

*Democrats are listed in upper and lower case letters. Republicans are listed in all capital letters.
LI-Libertarian I-Independent

General:

John Culver	581,545	45.5%
CHARLES GRASSLEY	683,014	53.5%
Robert Hengerer (LI)	4,233	0.3%
Gary DeYoung (I)	5,858	0.5%
John Henderson (I)	2,336	0.2%

Minnesota's 6th District

Convention: May 3 IR; May 4 DFL

Archie Baumann*	—
Alec Olson	—
Tad Jude	—
J. Buford Johnson	—

VIN WEBER*	—
AL JOHNSON	—
MILDRED THYMIAN	—

Primary: September 9

Archie Baumann	14,526	71.2%
Pat O'Reilly	5,867	28.8%

VIN WEBER	18,154	87.2%
FRANCIS BRUNTON	2,655	12.8%

General:

Archie Baumann	126,173	47.3%
VIN WEBER	140,402	52.7%

Oklahoma's 4th District

Primary: August 26

David McCurdy	26,173	34.1%
James Townsend	31,104	40.5%
Clifford Townsend	7,035	9.1%
Cuffie Waid	10,722	14.0%
Rosella Saker	1,781	2.3%

*Nominee

HOWARD RUTLEDGE	8,196	68.8%
DAVID HOPPER	3,710	31.2%

Runoff: September 16

David McCurdy	33,520	51.2%
James Townsend	31,940	48.8%

General:

David McCurdy	74,245	51.0%
HOWARD RUTLEDGE	71,339	49.0%

Pennsylvania's 24th District

Primary: April 22

David DiCarlo	Unopposed	
MARC L. MARKS	Unopposed	

General:

David DiCarlo	86,567	49.6%
MARC L. MARKS	86,687	49.7%
Edward Hammer (I)	1,301	0.7%

Utah's 1st District

Convention: June 29

JAMES HANSEN*	—	
JED RICHARDSON	—	

General:

Gunn McKay	144,459	47.9%
JAMES HANSEN	157,111	52.1%

*Nominee

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INDIANA
(11 districts)


EAST CHICAGO
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HAMMOND
MICHIGAN CITY
SOUTH BEND
MISHAWAKA
ELKHART
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LA PORTE
ST JOSEPH
ELKHART
LAGRANGE
STEUBEN
LAKE
PORTER
STARKE
MARSHALL
KOSCIUSKO
NOBLE
DE KALB
4
WHITLEY
ALLEN
FORT WAYNE
NEWTON
JASPER
PULASKI
2
FULTON
WHITE
CASS
MIAMI
WABASH
HUNTINGTON
WELLS
ADAMS
BENTON
CARROLL
5
MARION
GRANT
KOKOMO
HOWARD
BLACKFORD
JAY
WARREN
LAFAYETTE
TIPPECANOE
CLINTON
TIPTON
DELAWARE
MUNCIE
10
MADISON
ANDERSON
RANDOLPH
FOUNTAIN
MONTGOMERY
BOONE
HAMILTON
HENRY
VERMILLION
PARKE
HENDRICKS
MARION
11
HANCOCK
WAYNE
RICHMOND
INDIANAPOLIS
7
PUTNAM
RUSH
FAYETTE
UNION
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MORGAN
JOHNSON
SHELBY
FRANKLIN
TERRE HAUTE
VIGO
CLAY
OWEN
DECATUR
COLUMBUS
BARTHOLOMEW
BLOOMINGTON
MONROE
BROWN
SULLIVAN
GREENE
RIPLEY
DEARBORN
JENNINGS
OHIO
JACKSON
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SWITZERLAND
JEFFERSON
LAWRENCE
KNOX
DAVIESS
MARTIN
SCOTT
WASHINGTON
ORANGE
CLARK
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GIBSON
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DUBOIS
CRAWFORD
FLOYD
NEW ALBANY
HARRISON
POSEY
VANDERBURGH
EVANSVILLE
WARRICK
SPENCER
PERRY

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PENNSYLVANIA

(25 districts)


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BRISTOL
PHILADELPHIA
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NORRISTOWN
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CHESTER
SCRANTON
BETHLEHEM
ALLENTOWN
POTTSTOWN
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WILKES-BARRE
HAZLETON
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READING
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16
LEBANON
LANCASTER
11
HARRISBURG
19
YORK
WILLIAMSPORT
17
STATE COLLEGE
9
ALTOONA
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JOHNSTOWN
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PLUM
PITTSBURGH
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18, 20
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ERIE
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NEW CASTLE
WASHINGTON
22

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MINNESOTA

(8 districts)


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BLOOMINGTON
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WINONA
ROCHESTER
AUSTIN

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OKLAHOMA

(6 districts)


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OTTAWA
DELAWARE
ADAIR
SEQUOYAH
LE FLORE
MC CURTAIN
CRAIG
NOWATA
BARTLESVILLE
WASHINGTON
ROGERS
MAYES
CHEROKEE
WAGONER
MUSKOGEE
HASKELL
LATIMER
PUSHMATAHA
CHOCTAW
TULSA
OKMULGEE
MC INTOSH
PITTSBURG
ATOKA
BRYAN
OSAGE
CREEK
OKFUSKEE
HUGHES
COAL
PAWNEE
PAYNE
STILLWATER
LINCOLN
MIDWEST CITY
SHAWNEE
POTTAWATOMIE
SEMINOLE
PONTOTOC
JOHNSTON
MARSHALL
KAY
PONCA CITY
NOBLE
LOGAN
OKLAHOMA
OKLAHOMA CITY
NORMAN
CLEVELAND
MC CLAIN
GARVIN
MURRAY
CARTER
ARDMORE
LOVE
GRANT
ENID
GARFIELD
KINGFISHER
CANADIAN
DEL CITY
GRADY
STEPHENS
JEFFERSON
ALFALFA
MAJOR
BLAINE
CADDO
COMANCHE
LAWTON
COTTON
WOODS
WOODWARD
DEWEY
CUSTER
WASHITA
KIOWA
TILLMAN
HARPER
ELLIS
ROGER MILLS
BECKHAM
GREER
JACKSON
HARMON
BEAVER
TEXAS
CIMARRON

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IOWA

(6 districts)


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DUBUQUE
CLINTON
DAVENPORT
CEDAR RAPIDS
IOWA CITY
BURLINGTON
WATERLOO
CEDAR FALLS
OTTUMWA
MASON CITY
MARSHALLTOWN
AMES
DES MOINES
FORT DODGE
COUNCIL BLUFFS
SIOUX CITY

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UTAH

(2 districts)


BOUNTIFUL
SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE
OREM
PROVO
UTAH
1
2

Conference Participants

December 11-14, 1980

Campaign Personnel

John Maxwell, Chuck Grassley for U.S. Senate Campaign, Iowa
Larry Hiler, John Hiler for Congress Campaign, Indiana 3
Howard Rigtrup, James Hansen for Congress Campaign, Utah 1
David and Beverly DiCarlo, David DiCarlo for Congress Campaign, Pennsylvania 24
Dennis and Barbara McQuaid, Dennis McQuaid for Congress Campaign, California 5
Maria Malooly, Vin Weber for Congress Campaign, Minnesota 6
David Muller, Howard Rutledge for Congress Campaign, Oklahoma 4

Staff and Other Participants

Paul M. Weyrich
Fritz Rench
Stuart Rothenberg
Rick Neal
Connaught Marshner
Marc Nuttle
Paul Ogle
Robert McAdam
John Schrote
Sal Russo
Richard Knox
LaDonna Lee
Schuyler Baab
Anne Stanley
James Loyd
Robert Moore
Tony Payton
Russ Schriefer

Special Presentation

Lance Tarrance, V. Lance Tarrance & Associates, Houston, Texas.

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Trends in the 1980 Congressional Election is based on a conference held shortly after the November, 1980 elections for the purpose of analyzing selected congressional races. For those who are active participants in politics, the information presented here is intended to go beyond a theoretical examination of broad political movements. Rather, it details those elements which helped make certain 1980 campaigns successful and others unsuccessful. The conference conclusions not only clarify the election results in these districts, they also indicate the directions trends in campaign techniques may take for the coming years.

Here are some excerpts:

- "Contrary to what most candidates believe, a contested primary is not a political liability. It is very often the case that a candidate who is considering a race will approach a possible contributor using the argument that the campaign will not have the 'drain' of a contested primary. Although a primary may mean the loss of some early money, the least that can be said is that the advantages balance out the disadvantages . . . it is very possible that a contested primary is a genuine asset."
- ". . . another key element present in winning campaigns was their ability to engage their opponents in a genuine public exchange and make the race competitive. Winners were able to get the opposition to react to what they were saying and to address the issues. The losers were unable to get their opponents to recognize them, and the races were less competitive, at least verbally, a result . . . For the campaigns studied, there was no such thing as 'sneaking up on' their opponents."

$2.50

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